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Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The 
Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change 
Timothy J. Sullivan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Punitive damages1 traditionally have been awarded in a vari-
ety of tort actions,2 but it has long been presumed that punitive 
damages are not available in the standard action for breach of 
contract.3 Recently, however, commentators have perceived an 
increase in the number of contract cases in which punitive dam-
ages have been awarded.4 and have attempted to elucidate the 
reasons for this purported shift in the law. Some suggest that 
the greater availability of punitive damages is aimed at punishing 
abusive conduct against plaintiffs with relatively weak bargain-
ing power by defendants possessing greater economic leverage. 5 
Professor Gilmore contends that approval of punitive damage 
awards in contract actions is a particular illustration of a more 
general phenomenon; the reabsorption of contract law into the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. 
It is unusual to include a dedication in an Article of this modest 
scope. For reasons compelling to the author, however, this Article is ded-
icated to his grandfather, Judge Albert L. Caris of the Common Pleas 
Court of Portage County, Ohio. For thirty years he was a trial lawyer 
of unexcelled ability; for twenty-five more he has been a trial judge of 
great learning and great humanity. He has honored the law. 
1. Punitive damages, sometimes called exemplary damages or 
"smart money" have been defined as a sum not designed principally to 
compensate the plaintiff for pecuniary loss, but rather to punish the de-
fendant for willful and malicious conduct and to serve as a deterrent 
to other potential tortfeasors. C. McCoRMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 
§ 77, at 275-76 (1935). 
2. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (4th 
ed. 1971). 
3. 5 A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACTS, § 1077 (1964). 
4. 2 S. WILLISTON, A TREATisE oN THE LAw OF CoNTRACTS § 1340 
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968); Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Con-
tract, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 284 (1959); Note, The Expanding Availability of 
Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REv. 668 (1975); Note, 
Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract in South Carolina, 1(} S.C.L.Q. 
444 (1958); Note, Exemplary Damages in Contract Cases, 7 WILLAMETl'E 
L.J. 137 (1971). 
5. See Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in 
Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668, 678-81 (1975). 
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main body of tort law from which contract principles emerged 
more than a century ago.6 . 
This Article will evaluate the assertion that punitive dam-
ages for breach of contract are more readily available now than 
in the past. This requires an inquiry into the history of punitive 
damages and the reasoning of older cases which were decided 
in accordance with traditional rules that discouraged such awards 
in contract actions. A broader but related question will also be 
addressed: do decided contract cases in which punitive damages 
have been awarded produce results consistent with the general 
aims of contract damage law? 
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. ENGLAND 
The historical origins of punitive damages are best under-
stood in connection with the development of the jury as a judicial 
institution and the evolution of damage law as a part of the Eng-
lish legal system. While this is not a place for a lengthy histori-
cal treatment of legal institutions whose origins and development 
have been ably described elsewhere,7 some attention to the his-
torical perspective is necessary to an accurate evaluation of the 
modern cases treating punitive damages in contract law. 
The award of pecuniary damages came late in the develop-
ment of the common law; rules for controlling the assessment of 
damages came even later.8 Most suits in the early royal courts 
were proprietary in character; that is, the plaintiff's objective 
was not to receive a judgment for some pecuniary sum but rather 
to obtain a judicial declaration establishing his entitlement to the 
return of some species of property of which he had been de-
prived.9 Although there were some actions resulting in what 
modern lawyers might call damage awards before the thirteenth 
century,lt~ the rise of trespass at the beginning of that century 
6. See G. GILMORE, 'I'm: DEATH oF CONTRACT 83 (1974). 
7. See, e.g., 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312-50 
(7th ed. 1966); S. MILSOM, HisTORICAL FoUNDATIONS OF THE CoMMON LAW 
358-61 (1969); T. Pr.uCKNETT, A CoNcisE HisToRY oF THE CoMMON LAw 
106-38 (5th ed. 1956); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATisE ON EviDENCE 
AT THE COMMON LAW 46-84 (1898). . 
8. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 LAW Q. 
REV. 345 (1931). 
9. PLUCKNETT, supra note 7, at 364-65. 
10. The twelfth century novel disseisin actions occasionally resulted 
in a kind of pecuniary award to the plaintiff in addition to the specific 
relief requested. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, 'I'm: HisTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAw 522-24 (2d ed. 1898). But cf. MILsoM, supra note 7, at 117-19. 
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created the conditions that would ultimately make award of pe-
cuniary compensation commonplace in Anglo-American law.n 
Acceptance of the idea that litigants should be entitled to an 
award of damages gave rise to the perplexing problems of deter-
mining how such da:mages should be measured and by whom. 
There were two alternatives: damages could be measured by a 
pre-determined scale, or assessed according to the discretion of 
some tribunal.12 There was certainly tradition to support a sys-
tem which measured damages by a fixed schedule. Early Anglo-
Saxon law had developed a detailed system of fixed tariffs aimed 
at compensating the victim of acts that would be classed as tor-
tious or criminal under modern law.18 Yet despite such prece-
dent, the King's courts rejected the fixed tariff approach to the 
assessment of damages. The judges of the time, seeking to re-
lieve themselves of as many difficult problems of damage law as 
possible,14 turned instead to the jury.U' 
Once the power to assess damages had been broadly com-
mitted to the discretion of the jury, there was, of course, no need 
for lawyers or judges to concern themselves with elaborating 
standards by which to measure the quantum of damages. It is 
rare to find an English court discussing substantive principles of 
11. Modern concepts of civil liability grew from actions in trespass. 
McCoRMicK, supra note 1, § 5, at 23 (1935). See al.so Mn.soM, supra 
note 7, at 244. 
12. Washington, supra note 8, at 345. 
13. These fixed tariffs were called wer, bot, and wite. The sum pay-
able to the victim was strictly prescribed. 2 PoLLOCK & MAITLAND, 
supra note 10, at 457-58. Aspects of the Anglo-Saxon law survived well 
into the Norman period. PLUCKNETT, supra note 7, at 9. 
14. The jury might have been considered little more than a body 
of witnesses had the judges of the thirteenth century remained, like Brae-
ton, conversant with canon or civil law. 1 HoLDSWORTH, supra note 
7, at 318. In the thirteenth century, however, judges were increasingly 
drawn from practitioners before the royal courts. These men, lacking 
much breadth of learning, Mn.soM, supra note 7, at 29-30, were more 
than willing to commit what we would consider judicial functions to the 
jury: "Roper, in his life of More, tells us that More said of the judges, 
'They see, that they may, by the verdict of the jury, cast off all quarrels 
from themselves upon them, which they account their chief defence.' " 
1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 318 n.2. 
15. With the decline of the ancient methods of rendering judgments 
-trial by ordeal or trial by battle-the jury assumed greater importance 
in the early English legal system. Since the jury became a substitute 
for the ancient methods of trial whose results were thought to be divinely 
ordained, the jury's verdict at first "inherited the inscrutability of the 
judgments of God.'' 1 HoLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 317. At first, 
the jury was composed of neighbors of the parties who either had per-
sonal knowledge of the facts or who might have the means to ascertain 
the facts. Thus, early juries had a function not unlike that of witnesses. 
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damage law until w~ry near the end of the eighteenth century.16 
Because juries were capable of rendering verdicts that were ei-
ther obviously excessive or grossly inadequate, however, the 
courts had to devise some means of controlling and reviewing 
jury verdicts.17 Thus, the evolution of English damage law must 
for some centuries be traced in judicial decisions that focus upon 
the proper procedural means of controlling jury verdicts ren-
dered in the absence of any significant substantive law of dam-
ages. 
The writ of attaint18 was the first and, for a time, a most ef-
fective means of setting aside an erroneous verdict and punishing 
the members of a jury which had rendered a false verdict.19 The 
origin of attaint is obscure,20 but it is reasonably certain that at-
taint became available for an improper assessment of damages as 
early as 1275.21 In particular cases, attaint offered the defendant 
some protection against a runaway jury. Infirmities in the pro-
cedural incidents of attaint, however, made it an unlikely vehicle 
for the creation of a rational damage rule structure. First, the 
jury of attaint was an ad hoc body. Its impermanence made it 
unlikely that any consistent rules of damage law would emerge 
from its deliberations.22 Second, as long as the petty jury re-
tained a vestige of its witnessing functions, the jury of attaint 
was forbidden to consider any evidence not before the petty jury 
whose work it was reviewing.23 These deficiencies as well as the 
extreme severity of the penalty24 attendant upon a finding by the 
Indeed, special efforts were made to select a jury that had particular 
knowledge of the transaction out of which the suit arose. THAYER, 
supra note 7, at 93-94. 
16. Washington, supra note 8, at 346. 
17. Id. at 358. 
18. The writ of attaint, analogous to the modern motion for a new 
trial, permitted inquiry into a jury verdict, usually conducted by a grand 
jury of 24 persons. If they found that the original verdict was false, 
the correct judgment was entered and the attainted jurors suffered se-
vere penalties. See note 24 infra. For a comprehensive treatment of 
the writ of attaint, see Zane, The Attaint, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1, 127 (1916). 
19. The law did not distinguish between verdicts that were con-
sciously false and those that were the product of innocent or ignorant 
mistake. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 542. 
20. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 337. 
21. THAYER, supra note 7, at 147. 
22. Washington, supra note 8, at 349-50. 
23. 1 HoLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 341. 
24. The punishment for attainted juries was 
[a]ll of the first jury shall be committed to the King's prison, 
their goods shall be confiscated, their possessions seized into the 
King's hands, their habitations and houses shall be pulled down, 
their woodland shall be felled, their meadows shall be plowed up 
1977] !>UNITiVE DAMAGES 211 
jury of attaint that the petty jury had rendered a false verdict, 
made attaint obsolete by the sixteenth century.25 
With the decline of attaint, other doctrines of control evolved 
and courts began gradually to assert the authority to revise a 
jury's verdict. In its early stages, the judicial prerogative was 
exercised cautiously and confined to a very narrow range of 
cases.26 As long as a jury retained some of its witnessing func-
tions, no court could with confidence alter a jury's verdict, since 
such a verdict was based, partially at least, upon knowledge pe-
culiarly that of individual jurors.27 Only when the court had 
certainty of information concerning the nature of an injury 
would it presume to modify a jury damage award. Presumably 
in cases brought on the writ of debt, the test of certainty of infor-
mation had been met, and a court could act to revise the verdict.28 
In cases which modern lawyers would classify as tort ac-
tions, however, requests for judicial revision of jury verdicts 
were rejected on the ground that the court lacked the necessary 
certainty of information. 29 Thus at the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, although judges had asserted some revisory pow-
ers, the authority of the jury effectively to render a final verdict 
in most cases remained essentially intact. 
The obsolescence of attaint and the timidity of common law 
judges in asserting any general power of jury control produced, 
if not a crisis in the legal system, at least a growing sensitivity 
to the need for reform. Not for the first time iri English history, 
and they themselves forever thenceforward be esteemed in the 
eye of the law infamous. 
Quoted in Pt.ucKNETT, supra note 9, at 31. There is some evidence that 
despite the severity of the prescribed penalties some attainted jurors 
escaped with modest fines, 2 PoLLocK & MAITLAND, supra. note 10, 
at 542. 
25. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra. note 7, at 341-42. 
26. Some authority for the proposition that judges had the power 
to reverse jury verdicts could be found in the established practice of 
courts to assess damages in cases where judgment had been given on 
default, demurrer, or confession. Washington, supra note 8, at 351. The 
development of legal doctrines increasing the court's power tQ revise 
jury verdicts was influenced by the parallel evolution of rules gov-
erning the scope of judicial power to fix damages when a case was 
resolved short of a submission to the jury. 
27. 1 HoLDSWORTH, supra. note 7, at 346. 
28. Washington, supra note 8, at 356. 
29. In Bonham v. Sturton, 73 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1554), the court 
refused to reduce damages in a slander action. The court indicated that 
the decision would have been otherwise had the plaintiff brought, for 
example, an action in mayhem. In such a case the court could view 
the damage and determine its extent with c~rtainty. 
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equity intervened. The chancellor began to order new trials at 
law as a means of correcting improper jury verdicts.30 The re-
sponse of the law judges was predictable: they also began to 
grant new trials. In Bright v. Eynon,31 Lord Mansfield reviewed 
the reasons for the change in policy: 
Indeed, for a good while . . . the granting of new trials was 
holden to a degree of strictness, so intolerable, that it drove the 
parties into a Court of Equity, to have, in effect, a new trial at 
law, of a mere legal question; because the verdict, in justice, 
under all the circumstances, ought not to conclude . . . . And 
therefore of late years, the Courts of Law have gone more liber-
ally into the granting of new trials, according to the circum-
stances of the respective cases.s2 
It was not until 1655 in Wood v. Gunston,38 however, that a 
new trial was granted simply on the ground of an improper dam-
age award. The plaintiff in an action for slander had obtained 
a judgment below for 1500 pounds. In opposing the defendant's 
motion for a new trial, plaintiff's counsel argued that there were 
no precedents on the books for granting a new trial simply on ac-
count of "the greatness of the damages."34 The court, while con-
ceding that judicial power to grant new trials must be exercised 
sparingly, nonetheless ordered a new trial at the next term. With 
the decision in Wood, although the road ahead was not always 
smooth,85 the courts' power to order new trials on the ground 
of an excessive damage award was established. 
In exercising the power to set aside jury verdicts, however, 
judges continued to distinguish between tort and contract cases, 
manifesting a greater reluctance to set aside verdicts in tort 
cases.36 An eighteenth century judge explained the differing 
treatment of tort and contract cases in th,is fashion: 
The utmost that can be said is, and very truly, that the same 
rule does not prevail upon questions of tort, as of contract. In 
contract the measure of damages is generally matter of account, 
30. Washington; supra note 8, at 358. 
31. 97 Eng. Rep. 365 (K.B. 1757). 
32. Id. at 367. 
33. 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655). 
34. Id. Sargent Maynard, plaintiff's counsel, adopted the strategy 
of any lawyer attempting to resist an onrushing tide of reform. He ar-
gued that this novel doctrine, new trial, ought not to be extended. He 
warned against unnamed dangerous consequences should new trials be 
granted in cases of this kind. He lost. 
35. Wood was decided in the Commonwealth period. Its standing 
as authority was for a time questioned. By 1726, however, the King's 
Bench was granting new trials for excessive damages on a discretionary 
basis. Washington, supra note 8, at 362-63. 
36. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text. 
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and the damages given may be demonstrated to be right or 
wrong. But in torts a greater latitude is allowed to the jury: 
and the damages must be excessive and outrageous to require 
or warrant a new trial,37 
213 
It was against this background of judicial disinclination to med-
dle with jury verdicts in tort cases that the doctrine of punitive 
damages emerged. 
The principal case to which the origin of punitive damages 
is traced is Huckle v. Money.38 Pursuant to an illegal warrant, 
the plaintiff, a journeyman printer, had been wrongfully seized 
by an agent of the King. Although while in custody he had been 
"used very civilly" so that, in the court's opinion, only a small 
personal injury had been done, the court, emphasizing that the 
government's conduct had been outrageous-comparable even to 
the Spanish Inquisition-held that the jury had been right in 
awarding "exemplary damages." The court granted a new trial, 
however, because the amount of the award was excessive, but 
cautioned that in light of the government's culpable conduct, "it 
must be a glaring case indeed of outrageous damages in a tort, 
and which all mankind at first blush must think so, to induce 
a Court to grant a new trial for excessive damages.''39 
In Tullidge v. Wade,40 the judges of the King's Bench reaf-
firmed their endorsement of the doctrine of punitive damages. A 
large jury award to the plaintiff, whose unmarried daughter had 
become pregnant by the defendant, was appealed. Chief Justice 
Wilmot, in sustaining the verdict below, observed: 
Actions of this sort are brought for example's sake; and al-
though the plaintiff's loss in this case may not really amount 
to the value of twenty shillings, yet the jury have done right 
in giving liberal damages . . . if much greater damages had been 
given, we should not have been dissatisfied therewith; the plain-
tiff having received this insult in his own house ... ,41 
Other early English cases applied similar reasoning in sus-
taining an award of punitive damages. In Merest v. Harvey,42 
for example, the defendant, while drunk, had attempted to join 
in a private hunting party on plaintiff's land. The plaintiff re-
fused to permit the defendant to hunt with him. The defendant, 
undeterred, proceeded to fire off a number of rounds, even asking 
the plaintiff to supply him additional ammunition. The plaintiff 
37. Sharpe v. Brice, 96 E~g. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1774). 
38. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.1763). 
39. Id. at 769. 
40. 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769). 
41. Id. 
42. 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814). 
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was awarded 500 pounds. To the argument of defendant's coun-
sel that the damages were excessive and should be set aside, the 
court replied: 
I wish to know, in a case where a man disregards every 
principle which actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to 
restrain him except large damages? To be sure, one can hardly 
conceive worse conduct than this. I do not know upon what 
principle we can grant a rule in this case, unless we were to lay 
it down that the jury are not justified in giving more than the 
absolute pecuniary damage that the Plaintiff may sustain.43 
The early decisions show that the acceptance of punitive 
damages in English law was not the product of any deliberate ju-
dicial design. Some courts simply observed that in tort actions 
large verdicts would be sustained because the character of tort 
rules allowed greater jury discretion.44 Only in the later cases 
such as Merest45 did courts begin to justify large tort awards 
which had no pecuniary basis by reference to the defendant's 
egregious conduct or the principle that such judgments might 
serve as warning symbols to potential tortfeasors. By the early 
nineteenth century, then, the English law concept of punitive 
damages had become a doctrine whose contours would be recog-
nizable by twentieth century lawyers. 
B. THE UNITED STATES 
Cases in which punitive damages were awarded are found 
very early in the American reports. In Coryell v. Colbaugh,46 de-
cided in the late eighteenth century, the New Jersey supreme 
court sanctioned the award of punitive damages in an action for 
a breach of promise to marry. 47 In sustaining the correctness of 
the trial judge's charge to the jury, the court emphasized the ex-
emplary nature of such awards: 
He [the trial judge] told the jury that they were not to esti-
mate the damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual 
loss; but to give damages for example's sake, to prevent such 
offences in future . . . . [He] told the jury they were bound to 
no certain damages, but might give such a sum as would mark 
their disapprobation, and be an example to others.48 
43. Id. 
44. Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1774) ; Beardmore v. 
Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 793-94 (K.B. 1764). 
45. 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814). 
46. 1 N.J.L. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1791). 
47. Although punitive damages were not readily awarded for 
breach of contract, the breach of a contract to marry has been tradition-
ally treated as an exception to the general rule. See notes 90-94 infra 
and accompanying text. 
48. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1791) (emphasis 
added). 
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By the middle of the nineteenth century the award of puni-
tive damages in tort was a well established part of the American 
legal system.49 From the beginning there was some confusion as 
to whether punitive damages had any genuinely compensatory 
function or whether they were designed solely to punish the de-
fendant and to serve as an e:x:ample to others.50 Although most 
nineteenth century courts agreed in emphasizing the predomi-
nantly punitive character of exemplary damages,51 some deci-
sions stressed their compensatory character.52 In Magee v. Hol-
land,53 for example, the New Jersey supreme court permitted the 
recovery of punitive damages as compensation for the wounded 
feelings of a father whose children had been abducted. With 
the increasing willingness of courts to permit separate recovery 
in tort actions for injury to feelings, efforts to characterize puni-
tive damages as even partially compensatory began to disappear. 
By 1891, a leading treatise on damages concluded: 
The allowance of exemplary damages gave rise for a time 
to the notion that mental suffering was not a subject for com-
pensatory damages. This notion has been generally aban-
doned ... ,54 
Despite the general acceptance. of the award of punitive dam-
ages in tort actions in a large majority of American jurisdictions, 
there was a flurry of judicial criticism of the doctrine after 1850. 
This general and sometimes critical reconsideration of the role of 
punitive damages in the remedial rule structure was caused prin-
cipally by a conflict of opinion between two of the major treatise 
writers of the era.55 Most judicial opinions on the subject 
did not argue against punitive damages per se, but were con-
cerned with determining the precise sort of injuries punitive 
49. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379 (1866); Bell 
v. Morrison, 27 Miss. 68 (1854); McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 377 (1854). 
50. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 
517, 520 (1957). 
51. See, e.g., Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492 (1880); Stoneseifer v. 
Sheble, 31 Mo. 243 (1860); Dibble v. Morris, 26 Conn. 415 (1857); Smith 
v. Sherwood, 2 Tex. 460 (1847); Duncan v. Stalcup, 18 N.C. 440 (1836). 
52. See, e.g., Ously v. Hardin, 23 TIL 352 (1860); McNamara v. King, 
7 Ill. 432 (1845); Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282 (1878). 
53. 27 N.J.L. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1858). 
54. 2 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEAsURE OF DAMAGES § 356 
(8th ed. 1891). 
55. The writers were Greenleaf and Sedgwick. The question which 
divided them was whether damage law could properly serve any func-
tion other than compensation. Greenleaf argued that the law of damages 
must serve a purely compensatory function. S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 253, at 242 n.1 (2d ed. 1848). Sedgwick be-
lieved that damages might appropriately supply non-compensatory 
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damages were properly intended to measur:e. 56 This debate over 
the nature of punitive damages was long and tedious. 57 Some 
courts expressed a measure of hostility toward a broadly based 
role for punitive damages in American law, but most of the deci-
sions upheld, at least in some form, the validity of such dam-
ages in selected tort actions. 58 In only a few instances were pu-
nitive damages flatly prohibited, 119 and some courts which had 
narrowly defined the appropriate scope of punitive damages 
shortly overruled themselves by defining the reach of the doc-
trine more broadly. 60 In sum, at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury the vast majority of American jurisdictions recognized the · 
doctrine of punitive damages in some form. 61 
III. DIVERGENT ASSUMPTIONS IN TORT AND CONTRACT 
DAMAGE LAW 
We have traced the remote historical origins and the more 
recent development of the concept of punitive damages in English 
and American law. We have still to consider the disparate philo-
sophical assumptions which underlie damages in tort and dam-
ages in contract. To some extent, the different rules which gov-
ern tort and contract damage awards may be explained as acci-
dents of history. Yet the differences between these rules were 
needs. 2 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 527 
(5th ed. 1869). The differences between the two learned authors may 
have largely been a matter of semantics. This was recognized by some 
courts that had occasion to weigh their opposing views. See, e.g., Hend-
rickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 387 (1886). 
56. McKeon v. Citizens' Ry., 42 Mo. 79 (1867); Fay v. Parker, 53 
N.H. 342 (1873); Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W.Va. 220, 6 S.E. 485 (1888). 
57. The court's opinion in Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873), for 
example, is 54 pages long. The court cites authorities as varied as Gro-
tius, Pufendorf, and the Greek myth of Pelion and Oss·a on Olympus. 
58. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Shown, 48 Tenn. 302 (1870). The court 
in Dougherty declared that punitive damages were wrong in theory, but 
that Tennessee precedents established the legitimacy of the doctrine. Id. 
at 306. 
59. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884); Spokane Truck 
& Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45,25 P.1072 (1891). 
60. See, e.g., Mayer v. Fro be, 40 W. Va. 246, 22 S.E. 58 (1895). 
Mayer specifically overruled Pegram v. Stortz, ·31 W. Va. 220, 6 S.E. 485 
(1888). 
61. Despite its general acceptance in some form, the role of punitive 
damages has not been uncontroversial See Walter & Plain, Punitive 
Damages: A Critical Analysis, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369 (1965). Since 1964, 
the doctrine has been strictly limited in England. Rookes v. Barnard, 
1 All E.R. 367 (A. C. 1964). See generally Hodgin & Veitch, Punitive 
Damages-Reassessed, 21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 119 (1972). 
1977] PUNITIVE DAMAGES 217 
also the product of conscious policy choices made by scholars, 
lawyers, and judges. These choices and their consequences must 
be understood before the judicial treatment of punitive damages 
in contract cases may be fully appreciated. 
A partial explanation for the continued legitimacy of puni-
tive damages in tort law may be found in the historical nexus be-
tween tort and criminal law. Holmes remarked their common 
origins;62 the draftsmen of the Restatement of Torts note that 
" ... unlike the law of contracts or of restitution, the law of torts, 
which was once scarcely separable from the criminal law, has 
within it elements of punishment or deterrence."63 The persist-
ence of punitive damages in tort law cannot, however, be ascribed 
wholly to the historical truth that the criminal law, with its em-
phasis on punishment, shared common roots with the law of 
tort. 64 Despite the occasional contention that the function of tort 
damages-absent an award of punitive damages-is purely com-
pensatory,65 the fact is that the distinction between punitive and 
compensatory damages in tort law is illusory. 66 So long as our tort 
law is fault-centered and liability is dependent upon a demon-
stration of fault, even so-called compensatory damages will have 
a punitive character.67 Absent the need to discourage culpable 
behavior, there is no compelling reason to extract compensation 
for the plaintiff's injury from the defendant. 
The argument of compensation explains what the plaintiff 
in a tort action receives. It does not explain why the defendant 
pays. The compensatory theory of tort law also fails to explain 
why a plaintiff injured through the "fault" of a defendant is 
compensated while other plaintiffs are not. as 
Thus, the existence of punitive damages in the law of tort is not 
simply an illogical anomaly in a larger body of damage rules oth-
erwise grounded in notions of mere pecuniary compensation. 
Punitive damages are but a more explicit recognition of the mani-
62. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 39 (1881). 
63. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 901, comment a, at 
538 (1939). 
64. See generally Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts, 
43 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 967 (1943). 
65. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884); Taber v. Hutson, 
5 Ind. 332 (1854). 
66. Demogue, Validity of the Theory of Compensatory Damages, 27 
YALE L.J. 585, 591-93 (1918); Note, supra note 50, at 522. 
67. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 
1177 (1931). 
68. Note, supra note 50, at 523 (footnote omitted). 
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fold role of punishment in a system of liability for civil wrongs 
which turns upon the concept of fault.G9 
In contrast to the multiple purposes that damages in tort are 
designed to serve, the object of contract damage law is compensa-
tion for pecuniary loss. The Restatement of Contracts, for ex-
ample, declares flatly that punitive damages are not recoverable 
for breach of contract, 70 and defines the measure of damages 
available to a successful plaintiff as "the net amount of the 
losses caused and gains prevented by the defendant's breach 
[of contract], in excess of savings made possible .... "71 Simi-
larly, the standard expressed in the cases is that the aggrieved 
plaintiff is only to be put in as good a position as performance 
would have placed him. 72 There seems to be no room in such 
a formulation for non-compensatory recoveries. 
Why should punitive damages be considered appropriate in 
tort and inappropriate in contract? One commentator has sug-
gested that the law of contract developed as a necessary incident 
of commercial life and speculated that non-compensatory puni-
tive damages may have no place in commercial transactions.73 
The traditional unavailability of punitive damages may be con-
sidered simply an accident of historical development.14 A part of 
69. Viewed in a larger perspective, punitive damages may be con-
sidered a part of the law of restitution in that they serve to protect 
against the unjust enrichment of the defendant. See McElwain v. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 245 Ore. 247, 421 P.2d 957 (1966). The defendant 
company in McElwain had failed to install available pollution control 
equipment in its manufacturing plant. Presumably, the cost of paying 
compensatory damages would be less than the cost of available equip-
ment. The court held that on these facts punitive damages were appro-
priate. The cited case is one in which the loss to the plaintiff was less 
than the gain derived. by the defendant from its tortious conduct. In 
such a case punitive damages serve to prevent the unjust enrichment of 
the tortfeasor. See generally Morris, supra note 67, at 1185-88. 
70. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932). Section 341 of the 
RESTATEMENT does permit recovery for mental suffering in specific kinds 
of contract actions. To this extent, the draftsmen of the RESTATEMENT 
recognize the legitimacy of non-pecuniary compensation in breach of con-
tract actions. It is interesting to note, however, that the draftsmen cate-
gorize this item of damage as close to the law of tort as possible. See 
id. § 341, comment a. 
71. Id. § 329. 
72. See, e.g., Barett Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg., 24 F.2d 329 (1st 
Cir. 1928); Belisle v. Berkshire Ice Co., 98 Conn. 689, 120 A. 599 
(1923); Brodsky v. Allen Hayosh Indus., 1 Mich. App. 591, 137 N.W.2d 
771 (1965); Silverstein v. Duluth News-Tribune Co., 68 Minn. 430, 71 
N.W. 622 (1897); 5 CoRBIN, supra note 3, § 992. 
73. Simpson, supra note 4, at 284. 
74. Washington, supra note 8, at 351-66. Since the amount of 
plaintiff's loss in a contract action could be assessed with greater cer-
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the explanation may also lie in the fact that parties to a contract 
create contractual obligations by an exercise of will; unlike the 
commission of a tortious act, failure to discharge these self-im-
posed obligations does not inevitably violate objective standards 
of societal conduct.75 Since breach of contract usually abuses no 
external standard of acceptable conduct, contract damages may 
be thought to have no punitive function.76 
Careful analysis, however, suggests that damages in tort and 
contract are similar in several respects. Professor Corbin, for ex-
ample, explicitly recognizes the multiple purposes that are served 
by the contract damage scheme, noting that contract damages not 
only compensate for pecuniary loss, but also operate as a substi-
tute for personal vengeance and act to deter other contract 
breaches. 77 The functional purposes of contract damages, how-
ever, are obscured by a thick overlay of judicial decisions and 
scholarly commentary which uncritically recite that the object 
of damages in contract is solely to compensate for pecuniary loss. 
Reliance on that shibboleth obscures the process of contract dam-
age measurement and disguises the multiple purposes such dam-
age awards are intended to further. What is compensation in a 
particular case? How can we know the true quantum of the 
plaintiff's loss? The invocation of a pecuniary compensation 
standard does not transform the inexact process of judicial in-
quiry into high science. In truth, the award of money damages 
in contract frequently constitutes nothing more than the calcula-
tion of a sum based upon uncertain speculation. 78 Such damage 
tainty, courts were more willing to set aside as "excessive," jury awards 
in such suits. It was judicial reluctap.ce to abrogate large awards in tort 
actions, where the losses were often less tangible, which set the stage 
for the development of later principles of punitive damages. See notes 
28-29 supra and accompanying text. 
75. See Hall, supra note 66, at 755. 
76. "The motive for the breach commonly is immaterial in an action 
on the contract." Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 
540, 547 (1902) (Holmes, J.) (citations omitted). 
77. 5 CoRBIN, supra note 3, § 1002. Tort recovery is also intended 
to substitute legal action for personal vengeance and to provide incentive 
to avoid wrongdoing in the future. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 4 at 17, § 5 
at 23. 
78. It is informed by a practical consideration of the probable 
in life as the equivalent of the certain. If a crop is destroyed 
before its maturity by the fault of a person, it is natural to 
presume that the crop, properly cared for, would have been 
harvested by its owner. . . . In practice, life imposes the neces-
sity of considering as true that which is probable. . . . 
Demogue, supra note 66, at 588-89 (footnote omitted). The fact that we 
have chosen to make specific performance an exceptional remedy in our 
scheme of contract damages means that we are forced to the hazardous 
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awards may have no avowedly punitive character, but since the 
precise extent of plaintiff's loss is often uncertain, can we say 
that damages in contract serve no purpose beyond recompense for 
pecuniary loss ?79 
The careful, comparative analysis of damages in tort and con-
tract has a curious effect. The once clear lines between punitive 
and compensatory damages seem to blur and, occasionally, to dis-
appear. The black letter rules which distinguish sharply be-
tween contract and tort damages sometimes obscure more than 
they reveal. We know that punitive damages are said to be alien 
to contract law; yet at a functional level contract damages may 
have a punitive effect. This is not to say that a contract damage 
award which gives more than a compensatory recovery is puni-
tive in the strict tort law sense. It is true, however, that 
every dollar recovered in a contract action in excess of actual 
pecuniary loss is inconsistent with the stated aim of contract 
damage law. From the defendant's perspective the difficulty of 
measuring precise pecuniary loss can mean a judgment that is 
theoretically improper in a contract suit. The law's sanctioning 
such a recovery may not be intentionally punitive, but from the 
defendant's point of view, it is punitive in effect. 
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE LAW OF 
CONTRACT: THE CASES 
A. SOME EARLY EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE 
The reports yield a multitude of cases which lend support to 
the general rule that punitive damages may not be recovered in 
contract. Abundant citations, both old80 and new, 81 support that 
task of predicting how the transaction might have turned out. See 
Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1145, 1146-47 (1970). 
79. The draftsmen of the REsTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS were sensitive 
to the fact that so-called compensatory awards may not always be exact 
approximations of actual loss. The draftsmen observe, however, that 
"[t]he fact that damages are sometimes awarded in spite of uncertainty 
in the extent of the harm does not make them punitive." REsTATEMENT 
OF CoNTRACTS§ 342, comment b (1932). The discomfort of the draftsmen 
is understandable in light of the RESTATEMENT's position that punitive 
damages are not available in contract. Id. § 342. The problem is not 
resolved by comment b. The purpose of the damage award that exceeds 
compensation may not be punitive, but its effect is surely punitive. 
80. See, e.g., Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355 (1858); Hoy v. Gro-
noble, 34 Pa. 9 (1859); Snow v. Grace, 25 Ark. 570 (1869); Burnett v. 
Edling & Edling, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 711 (1898). 
81. See, e.g., Seneca Falls Machine Co. v. McBeth, 246 F. Supp. 271 
(W.D. Pa. 1965); Eskew v. Camp, 130 Ga. App. 779, 204 S.E.2d 465 
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black letter proposition. It is nonetheless wrong to assume that 
the law of punitive damages in contract is settled. It is doubtful 
that the barriers to recovery of such damages in contract 
were ever as insurmountable as some of the treatises and many 
of the cases suggest.82 Within the last. decade, however, the pace 
of change in punitive damages rules has accelerated significantly. 
While the impact of this change has not touched every jurisdic-
tion with equal force, enough new law has been made by a suffi-
cient number of courts that the broad outlines of a new body of 
rules are discernible. 
Although the doctrine of punitive damages is part of the 
larger body of remedial rules, one of the principal impediments 
to analysis of contract cases treating the question of punitive 
damages is the consistent absence, particularly in the early cases, 
of any meaningful judicial discussion of the philosophy of dam-
age law. This may be because many judges are by nature not 
philosophers of the law; it may be a reflection of the fact that 
damage rules developed late in the history of the common law.83 
Whatever the explanation, we must begin without any firm idea 
of why, beyond adherence to traditional English standards, 
American courts have held, as a general rule, that punitive dam-
ages should not be awarded for breach of contract. 
Many of the older decisions that rejected the award of pu-
nitive damages in contract and troubled to cite any authority 
at all made summary reference to the treatises then popular.84 
An examination of the treatise cited is likely to produce no more 
enlightenment than the opinion which invoked its authority.s5 
Perhaps part of the difficulty is suggested by the decision of 
(1974); King v. Insurance Co. of North America, 273 N.C. 396, 159 S.E.2d 
891 (1968); Smith v. Piper, 423 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Liberty 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Outerbridge, 42 Misc. 2d 756, 249 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. 
Ct. 1963); Davis v. Tunison, 168 Ohio St. 471, 155 N.E.2d 904 (1959). 
82. See 11 Wn.LISTON, supra note 4, § 1340. 
83. Washington, supra note 8. 
84. Cumberland Tel. & Tel Co. v. Cartwright Creek Tel. Co., 128 
Ky. 395,407, 108 S.W. 875, 878 (1908) (citing 2 J. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 390 (3d ed. 1884)); Horton's Estate v. Sherwin, 
63 Okla. 259, 259-60, 164 P. 469, 470 (1917) (citing 3 W. ELLIO'l'T, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LA.W OF CONTRACTS § 2124 (1913)); Peterson v. Thomas, 24 
S.W. 1124 (Tex. Civ. App, 1893) (citing 1 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES§ 370 (8th ed. 1891) ). 
85. See, e.g., 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 54, § 370. It has been suggested 
that the development of English contract law in the nineteenth century 
owed much to the exertions of treatise writers of the period who them-
13elves borrowed heavily but discreetly from continental sources. Simp-
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the Texas supreme court in Houston & T.C. R.R. Co. v. Shirley,86 
in which the court rejected the award of punitive damages in 
contract, stating: 
The exclusion of such issues [punitive damages] in suits on con-
tract may be justified on the policy of limiting the uncertainties 
and asperities attending litigation of such issues, to that class of 
cases in which the nature of the wrong complained of renders 
those issues and evils to some extent unavoidable.s7 
The court may have intended to say that difficulty in assigning 
a value to the personal interests litigated in torts justifies non-
compensatory recoveries, while the typical contracts case, arising 
in a commercial context where the amount of loss is more easily 
fixed, does not invite the imposition of such damages. The 
court's meaning is unclear, but it attempted, at least, to treat the 
policy questions underlying the problem of punitive damages in 
contract. 
The modern decisions, commonly citing without discussion 
the earlier cases decided in the jurisdiction, are of little more 
help.88 All of this is not mere scholarly discontent with unreflec-
tive courts. The absence of clearly articulated reasons for a rule 
makes any attempt to explicate the relationships among the cases 
which purport to apply that rule doubly difficult. Some courts, 
in their more candid moments, have conceded as much. 89 
Even stated in its most unqualified form, the rule that puni-
tive damages are not recoverable in a contract action was never 
thought to apply without exception. Perhaps the earliest and 
most widely recognized exception to the general rule is found 
in actions for breach of contract to marry. Although it was not 
a universal practice,90 many courts sustained the award of puni-
son, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 LAW Q. REV. 
247, 250-58 (1975). No similar study of the influence of treatise writers 
on the development of American contract law has been produced. In 
view of the frequent citations to treatises by nineteenth century courts 
in the area of damage law under study here, the possibility of an Amer-
ican phenomenon equivalent to that described by Professor Simpson in 
England is very real. 
86. 54 Tex. 125 (1880). 
87. Id. at 142. 
88. See, e.g., Deming v. Buckley's Art Gallery, 196 F. Supp. 245 
(W.D. Ark. 1961). Some modern courts have troubled to discuss the 
broader policy issues raised by the award of punitive damages in con-
tract law. Aslip Homebuilders, Inc. v. Shusta, 6 Ill. App. 3d 65, 284 
N.E.2d 509, 512 (1972); DeLeon v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1965). 
89. See Z.D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345, 347 (Okla 
1975). 
90. See Smith v. Hill, 12 Ill. 2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1958). 
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tive damages in such cases.91 The justification for permitting 
these awards rests mainly upon the peculiar nature of. the inter-
ests invaded by breach of a contract to marry. Because the dam-
age suffered by the plaintiff is often uniquely personal,92 the 
character of the interest abused frequently has much more in 
common with a typical tort action than with the standard con-
tract action.93 Courts have been sensitive to the fact that in-
juries suffered by a plaintiff in such cases are difficult if not 
impossible to measure and have committed the question of dam-
age assessment to the jury without clear instructions regarding 
the standards to be applied in computing the amount of the re-
covery.9~ 
Although the special nature of contracts to marry has fur-
nished the justification for relaxing the prohibition against 
award of punitive damages, courts do not agree on the standard 
of wrongdoing that must be established before punitive damages 
may be awarded in such a case. Some courts seem to require a 
showing of fraudulent conduct or intent;95 others insist upon 
proof of malice;96 a few permit recovery if the defendant has 
acted ruthlessly.97 
Another early and widely recognized exception to the general 
rule that punitive damages are not available in contract was 
based on judicial acceptance of the notion that public service 
companies may be answerable in exemplary damages for failure 
to discharge their obligations to the public. While the origin of 
this exception to the general rule may be traced back into distant 
English history,98 it is sufficient to note that English law early 
91. See, e.g., Smith v. Hawkins, 120 Kan. 518, 243 P. 1018 (1926); 
Baumle v. Verde, 33 Okla. 243, 124 P. 1083 (1912). 
92. See Klitzke v. Davis, 172 Wis. 425, 179 N.W. 586 (1920). 
93. See Adams v. Griffith, 51 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Brown 
v. Douglas, 104 Ga. App. 769, 122 S.E.2d 747 (1961). 
94. Tamke v. Vangsness, 72 Minn. 236, 75 N.W. 217 (1898); Ferguson 
v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 39 S.W. 341 (1897). 
95. Syfert v. Solomon, 95 Cal. App. 228, 272 P. 810 (1928); Finkel-
stein v. Barnett, 17 Misc. 564,40 N.Y.S. 694 (Sup. Ct. 1896). 
96. Jacoby v. Stark, 205 ill. 34, 68 N.E. 557 (1903); Osmun v. Win-
ters, 30 Ore. 177, 46 P. 780 (1896). 
97. Sneve v. Lunder, 100 Minn. 5, 110 N.W. 99 (1907); Dupont v. 
McAdow, 6 Mont. 226, 9 P. 925 (1886). Careful distinctions among con-
cepts as amorphous as fraud, malice, and ruthlessness are, of course, dif-
ficult if not impossible to maintain. Many courts do not insist upon 
maintaining such artificial distinctions. See, e.g., Smith v. Hawkins, 120 
Kan. 518, 243 P. 1018 (1926). 
98. Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the 
Trust Problem, 17 HARv. L. REv. 156,217, l56-59 (1904). 
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recognized that those engaged in public or common callings99 had 
an obligation to serve all applicants for their services. In addition 
to this primary obligation, early English law also imposed certain 
supplemental duties, such as the requirement that service or 
treatment be reasonably adequate and provided on reasonable 
terms.100 Legal rules governing the common callings were 
shaped by the need to protect the public against exploitation or 
oppression by the providers of important public services. These 
legal duties were imposed because, under the economic conditions 
then prevailing, the innkeeper, surgeon, or smith engaged in a 
common calling very likely enjoyed a monopoly position within 
the community.101 
In modern society, it is not the barber or tailor but the com-
mon carrier or public utility that enjoys monopoly or quasi-
monopoly power. Thus, the rules governing the availability of 
a modern plaintiff's cause of action against a public utility or 
common carrier are an outgrowth of the English law of common 
callings. A typical earlier American case might have involved 
the purchaser of a railroad ticket who was not transported to the 
proper station.102 Such plaintiffs would frequently seek an 
award of punitive damages. The defendant's principal defense 
was likely to be that its issuance of a ticket to the plaintiff cre-
ated a contractual duty for the breach of which punitive damages 
could not be recovered. The judicial response to that defense was 
usually to point to the plaintiff's right, at his election, to bring 
an action in contract or in tort: 
It is therefore necessary to consider whether the action is one 
arising ex contractu or ex delicto. . . . The contract is stated 
as an inducement to the action, as the foundation of plaintiff's 
right to be on the train, to show that the plaintiff was lawfully 
there. It next charges that without consent of plaintiff the rail-
road company willfully and wrongfully, and with disregard of 
its duty to plaintiff, failed and refused to stop its train . . . and 
carried plaintiff beyond his destination. . . . Here is not only 
a breach of contract and a violation of public duty by the plain-
99. Among common callings recognized in the fifteenth century 
were the trades of barber, surgeon, smith, tailor, innkeeper, victualler, 
carrier, and ferryman. Id. at 160. The modern law of public service mo-
nopolies may be traced to the legal rules which emerged from the regu-
lation of those engaged in common callings. 
100. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service 
Companies, 11 CoLUM. L. REV. 514, 616, 743, 515 (1911). 
101. Wyman, supra note 98, at 160-61. But see Burdick, supra note 
100, at 515-24. 
102. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Southern Ry., 140 N.C. 123, 52 S.E. 263 
(1905); Ft. Smith & W. Ry. v. Ford, 34 Okla. 575, 126 P. 745 (1912). 
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tiff in error as a common carrier, but a willful, deliberate, con-
scious wrong.1os 
225 
It was thus the railroad's breach of duty to the public and not 
its failure to discharge obligations assumed by private contract 
which justified the award of punitive damages. By characteriz-
ing the plaintiff's action as one for tortious breach of a public 
duty, the courts were able to permit these recoveries without 
seeming insult to the general rule that such awards were not 
appropriate in contract actions.104 
The careful distinction drawn by numerous courts between 
actions in tort and actions in contract has not always been easy 
to maintain. The facts of many cases are not subject to ready 
classification; the "border land" between tort and contract is 
treacherous territory for even the ablest courts and commenta-
tors.105 A court which insists upon drawing a bright line be-
tween the two actions occasionally produces an opinion of un-
common obscurity.106 In the common carrier cases, especially 
when the injury alleged could only be categorized as basically 
contractual, additional reasons were needed to buttress the award 
of punitive damages. Sometimes, surprisingly, those reasons 
were found in the candid appraisal of the special legal responsi-
bilities that great political and economic power imposed upon a 
major monopoly enterprise: 
103. Ft. Smith & W. Ry. v. Ford, 34 Okla. 575, 578, 12o P. 745, 746 
(1912). 
104. See Carmichael v. Bell Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 S.E. 619 (1911); 
Davis v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 104 S.C. 63, 88 S.E. 273 (1916) ; Southwest-
ern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). 
But see Goins v. Western R.R. of Ala., 68 Ga. 190 (1881); DeWolf v. Ford, 
193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527 (1908). Some of the early cases which denied 
recovery of punitive damages in public service cases may be more read-
ily explained on the grounds that defendant's conduct was not suffi-
ciently malicious or willful to entitle plaintiff to recovery of punitive 
damages even in a conventional tort case. See Thomas v. Peterson, 24 
S.W. 1125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894). 
105. The exceptional difficulties inherent in the process of classifying 
an action as tort or contract have been perceived by great figures in each 
of these two legal fields. See 5 CoRBIN, supra. note 3, § 1077; PRossER, 
The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED ToPICS ON THE LAw 
OF TORTS 380 (1953). 
106. A good example of judicial gymnastics may be found in Trout 
v. Watkins Livery & Undertaking Co., 148 Mo. App. 621, 634, 130 S.W. 
136, 140 (1910), where the court observes, in discussing the liabilities of 
common carriers: 
In such circumstances the breach of contract gives rise to the 
tort; not, however, because it was wrong to breach the contract, 
but only because the law laid an obligation upon the carrier to 
perform his duty ... and he had breached the obligation im-
posed by law which, in the particular instance, arose from the 
relation <:reated by contract. In such cases, where there is an 
obligation imposed both by contract and by law upon the carrier 
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Many of the great railway systems of the country were built 
with the aid of government . . . subsidies. . . . Also, it is with 
money collected from the public that the railroad companies are 
enabled to pay high salaries and compensation to officers, attor-
neys, political agents, and othel' talented and skillful men to 
manage the business of the railroad companies .... 101 
At bottom, then, the fundamental justification for the award of 
punitive damages in public service corporation cases has been the 
desire to both punish and protect against the abuse of economic 
power. 
Certain distinctive elements in both promise to marry and 
public service cases help explain why they were exceptions to 
the general rule.108 In both types of cases, the courts have made 
room for punitive damages by casting their decisions more in the 
language of tort than of contract. In actions for breach of prom-
ise to marry this is possible because the interest invaded is typi-
cally highly personal; in public service corporation cases, a long 
and respectable historical usage permits a finding that there has 
been a breach of duty independent of contractual relations. More-
over, in the public service cases the defendant has usually been 
guilty of conduct which constitutes the abuse of economic power 
independent of the defendant's status as a party to a contract.109 
These early cases, which might appear to have but a restricted 
relevance to the development of modern law, are the source of 
ideas which have begun the transformation of the role of punitive 
damages in the modern law· of contract. 
B. BREACH oF A FIDUCIARY DuTY 
A number of courts have awarded punitive damages in ac-
tions involving breach of contract when the relationship between 
the parties is of a fiduciary character. In these cases, as in 
the public service cases, it is the breach of duty created by 
the relationship rather than the contract which is said to permit 
the recovery of punitive damages. Analyzed in this fashion, the 
and the breach of the contract operates a tort though entailing 
as well a breach of the obligation imposed by law, it is some-
times said the tort, though independent of, is, in a measure, 
dependent upon, the contract. 
107. Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 36 Nev. 247, 259, 134 P. 753, 761 
(1913). 
108. There were other minor, early exceptions to the general rule: 
Some courts intimated that if the condition of a bond given in accordance 
with statutory mandate is broken, punitive damages may be recoverable. 
See, e.g., Floyd v. Hamilton, 33 Ala. 235 (1858); Richmond v. Schickler, 
57 Iowa 486, 10 N.W. 882 (1881). 
109. See 5 CoRBIN, supra note 3, § 1077. 
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fiduciary duty cases are no more than innocent exceptions to the 
general rule. Yet it remains a fact-not often emphasized in the 
cases-that the relationship which established the duty was es-
sentially the product of contractual agreement. The necessary 
inquiry is to determine why, in a particular case, a court will em-
phasize the existence of a fiduciary duty and award punitive 
damages for the egregious breach of the duty. 
The decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Brown 
v. Coates110 presents a typical fact pattern in which punitive 
damages for breach of a fiduciary duty growing out of contract 
were held to be recoverable. The plaintiff was a homeowner who 
contracted with the defendant real estate broker to exchange a 
home owned by the plaintiff for one listed with the defendant. 
The defendant was to sell the plaintiff's home and apply the 
plaintiff's equity realized on the sale to the purchase price of 
the plaintiff's new home. After selling the plaintiff's home, the 
defendant denied that he had agreed to apply the net proceeds 
from the sale to the purchase price of the new home. The trial 
court awarded compensatory and punitive damages to the plain-
tiff. 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court. In an opinion by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger, the 
court acknowledged that punitive damages for the breach of an 
ordinary contract are not favored in the law, but justified the 
award on the ground that real estate brokers assume fiduciary 
obligations toward their clients. The court pointedly refused, 
however, to adopt "any single, particular formula in upholding 
an award of punitive damages against a faithless agent,"111 but 
went on to state that 
once it has been shown that one trained and experienced 
holds himself out to the public as worthy to be trusted for hire 
. . . and those so invited do place their trust and confidence, and 
that trust is intentionally and consciously disregarded, and ex-
ploited for unwarranted gain, community protection, as well as 
that of the victim, warrants the imposition of punitive dam-
ages.112 
Although the court characterized the test it had framed as a nar-
row one,l13 the language quoted above is certainly susceptible of 
flexible application. 
110. 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
111. Id. at 40. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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The reach of Brown and other decisions114 that adopt simi-
lar reasoning is difficult to gauge. Rarely do courts attempt to 
define the scope of the fiduciary duty which was allegedly 
violated. Instead, attention is focused narrowly on the facts 
at hand. Few of the decisions which permit the recovery of puni-
tive damages for breach of fiduciary duty or a duty of trust re-
flect sensitivity to the potential reach of the exception thus sanc-
tioned. 
A contrary line of decisions, not factually distinguishable 
from the more liberal decisions typified by Brown, reflects a nar-
row view of the right to recover punitive damages for breach of 
a fiduciary duty that is rooted in contract.1111 Courts that 
take a hard line against the award of punitive damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty often justify their holdings as necessary 
to uphold the established principle that non-compensatory recov-
eries are inimical to the principles underlying standard contract 
damage rules. 
Typical of the cases which a~opt a restrictive approach is 
Ranco Fertiservice, Inc. v. Laursen.116 In Ranco the plaintiff, a 
distributor of tractors, sued defendant, a retail dealer in equip-
ment supplied by plaintiff, for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. Plaintiff argued its entitlement to punitive damages on the 
grounds that defendant had wrongfully misrepresented the num-
ber of tractors he had sold and had withheld sums rightfully be-
longing to plaintiff. The court conceded that the defendant had 
breached a relationship of trust, but declared that since plaintiff's 
action was in essence contractual the award of punitive damages 
was improper.117 
The Ranco decision and others like it may be pejoratively 
classified as wooden. The clear-cut categories of tort and con-
114. See PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 417 
F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970); Boyd v. Bevi-
lacqua, 247 Cal. App. 2d 272, 55 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1967); Harper v. Inter-
state Brewery Co., 168 Ore. 26, 120 P.2d 757 (1942). Cf. Rove Farms Re-
sort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, 323 A2d 495 
(1974); Knobloch v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 46 App. Div. 2d 278, 362 
N.Y.S.2d 492 (1974). See also id. at 288, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 502, 505-06 
(Hopkins, J., dissenting). 
115. See, e.g., Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029 (1956) ; 
Burton v. Juzwik, 524 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1974). But see Burton v. Juzwik, 
supra at 20-21 (Doolin, J., dissenting); Graham v. Turner, 472 S.W.2d 
831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). See also Otto v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 
277 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1960); Zweifel v. Lee-Scherman Realty Co., 173 
S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App. 1943). 
116. 456 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1972). 
117. Id. at 991. 
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tract which the Ranco court professed to protect by its decision 
are often illusory. If decisions such as Ranco treat legal abstrac-
tions as the whole of reality, however, courts such as Brown, 
which take a more flexible view, may be fairly charged with judi-
cial sleight of hand. It is disingenuous to treat cases which pre-
sent breach of fiduciary duty in the contractual context as wholly 
distinct from ordinary contract actions. To speak of "narrow 
tests" as does Judge Burger in Brown suggests that phrases such 
as "fiduciary relationships" and "relations of trust"118 have an 
objective content. In reality such terms are almost as flexible as 
a court wishes to make them.119 Certainly a rational opinion 
might have been written in the Brown case which denied a right 
to recover punitive damages on the ground that plaintiff's com-
plaint raised issues that were essentially contractual. 
Thus, while Judge Burger chose to label plaintiff's claim as 
one for breach of a fiduciary duty, the choice thus made was not 
compelled by the immutable demands of some objectively co~­
prehensible legal doctrine. The cases in this area of the law are 
impossible to reconcile because the question in each is why a 
particular judge held that particular facts implied or did not 
imply the existence of a fiduciary duty.120 Such questions go 
to the heart of the judicial process and answers require insight 
into forces more fundamental than the uncertain power of for-
mal legal logic. 
C. CoNTRACT BREACH AccoMPANIED BY FRAUDULENT CoNDUCT 
The right to recover punitive damages for breach of contract 
when the defendant's conduct is deemed concurrently fraudulent 
is recognized in a number of jurisdictions as another exception 
to the general rule.121 Since fraudulent conduct may cut across 
118. Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 38-39 (1958). 
119. Phrases such as fiduciary relationship, relationship of trust, and 
confidential relationship are used interchangeably by the courts; the def-
inition of these terms is also vague, haphazard, and fragmentary. Bogert, 
ConfidentiaL Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 CORNELL 
L.Q. 237 (1928). 
120. Attempts to harmonize results in this field almost always end 
in failure. Even within the same jurisdiction conflicts are common. 
Compare Boyd v. Bevilacqua, 247 Cal. App. 2d 272, 55 Cal. Rptr. 610 
(1967), with Crogan v. Metz, ·47 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029 (1956). 
121. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal App. 2d 921, 
71 Cal. Rptr. 764 · (1968); Hedworth v. Chapman, 135 Ind. App. 129, 192 
N.E.2d 649 (1963); Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940); 
Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904); Hooks v. Fitzenrieter, 
76 Tex. 277, 13 S.W. 230 (1890). 
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the whole range of contractual relations, this exception to the 
general rule is of greater significance than the exceptional treat-
ment accorded the breach of specialized contracts such as those 
discussed in preceding sections.122 The rule permitting recovery 
of punitive damages for fraudulent breach of contractl23 is some-
times easier to state than to explain. This is partly the product of 
legal history and partly the consequence of a tendency in our 
legal system to rely on terms that are superficially precise but 
flexible enough to permit differing results without the too-
obvious appearance of inconsistency. 
The word "fraud," for example, is a catch-all term which in-
cludes, depending upon the jurisdiction, a variety of actions 
whose gravamen rests upon misrepresentation in some for.m.124 
The historical evolution of fraud is complex and confusing;125 in 
the hands of a creative court a "fraud" action may assume any 
one of a bewildering array of different legal and equitable per-
sonalities.126 In order to preserve the maximum freedom to deal 
with an alleged fraud-feasor, courts sometimes have refused to 
define the term: 
Fraud assumes so many hues and forms, that courts are com-
pelled to content themselves with comparatively few general 
rules for its discovery and defeat, and allow the facts and cir-
cumstances peculiar to each case to bear heavily upon the con-
science and judgment of the court .... 121 
122. See text accompanying note 108 supra. It is a mistake, how-
ever, to denigrate too much the role of punitive damages in cases of con-
tracts to marry and contracts with public service companies as merely 
a specialized backwater of historical interest. In fact, many of the most 
recent cases which carve out a new role for punitive damages in contract 
are very similar in their approach to the ideas expressed in the older 
cases. Some recent articles on punitive damages in contract only sum-
marily treat these important areas. See, e.g., Note, supra note 5, at 677-
78. 
123. For purposes of this Article the phrases "fraudulent breach of 
contract" and "breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act" will 
be used interchangeably. These are circumstances in which the two 
terms may have significantly different legal effects, however, particu-
larly if the phrase "breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act" 
is determined to be an action in contract. See, e.g., Bourne v. Maryland 
Cas. Co., 185 S.C. 1, 192 S.E. 605 (1937). 
124. PRossER, supra note 2, at 684. 
125. The historical development of actions for misrepresentation-
breach of warranty, deceit, and negligent misrepresentation-are treated 
in 1 T. STREET, ·THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 375-92 (1906), and 
Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARv. L. REV. 415, 
415-17 (1911). 
126. See Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REV. 749, 752 (1930). 
127. Sullivan v. Calhoun, 117 S.C. 137, 139, 108 S.E. 189, 190 (1921) 
(quoting 12 R.C.L., Fraud and Deceit, § 2, at 229 (1916)). 
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The judicial freedom derived from a definition of fraud couched 
in obscure terms exacts an important price: it makes the predic-
tion of results in future cases, always a hazardous undertaking, 
especially treacherous. Yet because punitive damages usually 
will be awarded .in contract actions only upon a satisfactory 
showing of fraudulent conduct, some analysis of the cases in 
which fraudulent conduct is alleged as a basis for the recovery 
of punitive damages is required. 
The landmark case in this field is Welborn v. Dixon,128 in 
which the South Carolina supreme court permitted the recovery 
of what it labeled punitive damages for the fraudulent breach of 
contract. The plaintiff had borrowed money from the defendant 
and, as security for the debt, had conveyed to him certain parcels 
of land. The parties made a concurrent agreement by which de-
fendant promised to reconvey the property upon timely repay-
ment of the debt. The defendant, however, violated the con-
tract and conveyed the property to a third party bona fide pur-
chaser. Thereupon, the plaintiff brought an action seeking both 
compensatory and punitive damages. The South Carolina court 
declared: 
There is no doubt as to the general principle, that in an action 
for breach of contract the motives of the wrongdoer are not to 
be considered in estimating the amount of damages . . . . When, 
however, the breach of the contract is accompanied with a fraud-
ulent act, the rule is well settled . . . that the defendant may 
be made to respond in punitive as well as in compensatory dam-
ages.129 
The Welborn holding has been applied in a large number of 
subsequent cases, 130 but any attempt to follow a common thread 
128. 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904). 
129. Id. at 115, 49 S.E. at 234. There is some question as to the valid-
ity of the court's assertion that the award of punitive damages for fraud-
ulent breach was well established in South Carolina. The court relied 
principally upon the authority of Rose & Rogers v. Beattie, 2 Nott & 
McC. 538 (S.C. 1820). In that case the plaintiff had purchased a lot 
of water packed cotton from the defendant in South Carolina. The plain-
tiff had shipped the cotton to England where it was sold. Upon discov-
ering the fraud, the English buyer returned the cotton to the plaintiff's 
English agent, who resold the cotton at a reduced price. The ques-
tion was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover only the price paid 
for the cotton in South Carolina or whether he could recover the differ-
ence in the two sale prices in England, plus incidental damages. The 
court awarded the plaintiff damages according to the latter formula. 
It is arguable that the result in Beattie is well within the rule of 
Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1845). See Welborn v. 
Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 120-22, 49 S.E. 232, 236-37 (1904) (Woods, J., dissent-
ing). 
130. See, e.g., Wright v. Public Sav. Life Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 285, 204 
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through the decisions is likely to prove frustrating131 because the 
concept of fraud is so hazy. Many cases could be cited which 
illustrate the difficulty, but several from two jurisdictions will 
suffice. 
In Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co.,132 the plain-
tiff and one other person had owned all of the stock of the de-
fendant. The plaintiff sold his stock and controlling interest in the 
corporation to a third person under the terms of an agreement 
which required that the plaintiff be retained as business manager 
of the defendant for at least three years. The board of directors of 
the defendant agreed to continue the plaintiff's employment for 
three years. The defendant, in violation of the agreement, dis-
charged the plaintiff well before the expiration of his three year 
term. The Supreme Court of South Carolina sustained a denial of 
punitive damages on the ground that no fraudulent act had been 
shown and that mere evil intent does not establish a right to pu-
nitive damages for fraudulent breach.183 
In Sullivan v. Calhoun,184 the plaintiff and the defendant en-
tered into a sharecropping agreement. Before the plaintiff could 
harvest the crops, the defendant "ran the plaintiff off said prem-
ises, gathered the crop, and refused to make an account to the 
plaintiff of his part thereof."185 The South Carolina court re-
jected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff had shown 
no fraudulent act accompanying the breach and held that the 
award of punitive damages was proper.186 
How can the award of punitive damages in Sullivan and the 
denial in Holland be explained? Both defendants acted in viola-
tion of their contractual obligations. In Holland, the plaintiff 
S.E.2d 57 (1974); West v. Service Life & Health Ins. Co., 220 S.C. 198, 
66 S.E.2d 816 (1951); Porter v. Mullins, 198 S.C. 325, 17 S.E.2d 684 (1941); 
Sturkie v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 180 S.C. 177, 185 S.E. 541 (1936); 
Schultz v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees, 175 S.C. 18-2, 178 S.E. 867 
(1935); Givens v. North Augusta Elec. & Improv. Co., 91 S.C. 417, 74 
S.E. 1067 (1912). 
131. Part of the difficulty is caused by the fact that the "rule" in 
Welborn has not been expressed with consistency. It is difficult to rec-
oncile, for example, the statements of the rule in Givens v. North 
Augusta Elec. & Improv. Co., 91 S.C. 417, 74 S.E. 1067 (1912), and Wil-
liams v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 173 S.C. 448, 176 S.E. 340 (1934). See 
generally Note, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract in South Caro-
lina, 10 S.C.L.Q. 444, 451-58 (1958). 
132. 166 S.C. 454, 165 S.E. 203 (1932). 
133. Id. at 468-69, 165 S.E. at 207-08. 
134. 117 S.C. 137, 108 S.E. 189 (1921). 
135. Id. at 138, 108 S.E. at 189. 
136. Id. at 139, 108 S.E. at 189. 
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was evicted from his office and ordered to remove his personal 
effects immediately; his salary was also abruptly terminated. In 
Sullivan, defendants, in some unspecified way, forced the plain-
tiff to leave land which he had an absolute legal right to occupy. 
Why were the acts of one defendant considered merely wrongful 
and the acts of the other specifically found to be fraudulent? It 
is true that some South Carolina cases suggest that mere failure 
to perform a contract, for example, by withholding money due, 
does not constitute fraud.137 But the defendants in Holland and 
Sullivan both took affirmative steps to breach their contracts. 
Perhaps defendant's conduct in Sullivan may have edged closer 
to violence or coercion, but the report does not so indicate, and 
even if true, are coercion or violence necessary ingredients of 
fraudulent conduct? W, e are left to speculate as to the legal basis 
for distinguishing the cases; the court in neither Holland nor Sul-
livan seemed moved to explain what the term "fraudulent con-
duct" meant within the context of the action brought or of the 
relief sought. 
The confusion in the South Carolina cases has its analogue 
in other jurisdictions that have adopted variant versions of the 
rule permitting the recovery of punitive damages for breach of 
contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. The problem may be 
conveniently illustrated by comparing two relatively recent Cal-
ifornia cases, Contractor's Safety Association v. California Com-
pensation Insurance CoP8 and Sharp v. Automobile Club of 
Southern California.lao 
In Contractor's, the defendant insurance company had repre-
sented to prospective customers that it would pay dividends ac-
cording to an established scale provided the customer maintained 
a loss-premium ratio below an agreed level. When the plaintiff 
filed a claim for a dividend payment according to the published 
scale, the defendant. refused to pay. The defendant cited a secret 
resolution of its board of directors adopted prior to the time plain-
tiff purchased insurance from the defendant which provided that 
no dividends would be paid until approved by further action of 
the board. The plaintiff sought punitive damages on the ground 
that the defendant's conduct was "fraudulent," "malicious," and 
"oppressive." 
137. See, e.g., Patterson v. Capital Life & Health Ins. Co., 228 S.C. 
297, 89 S.E.2d 723 (1955); Ray v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 206 
S.C. 344, 34 S.E.2d 218 (1945). 
138. 48 Cal. 2d 71, 307 P.2d 626 (1957). 
139. 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1964). 
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The supreme court rejected the plaintiff's claim, holding: 
"The third count though phrased in the language of fraud is 
clearly based upon breach of contract. The injury thus com-
plained of is the refusal of the defendant to perform the con-
tract."140 
In Sharp, the plaintiff, before renewing his automobile in-
surance with the defendant, sought and received assurances from 
the defendant that the medical payment provisions of the policy 
were payable without regard to whether plaintiff received reim-
bursement from a. collateral source. At the time these represen-
tations were made, it was not the defendant's policy to pay 
medical claims for which reimbursement had been received. 
Plaintiff subsequently filed a claim for medical expenses with the 
defendant. The defendant refused to pay the claim on the 
ground that plaintiff had received payment from his medical 
insurer. The plaintiff recovered punitive damages in the trial 
court. 
The court of appeals sustained the award of punitive dam-
ages. The opinion does not raise the question of whether the con-
tractual origin of plaintiff's claim made the recovery improper; 
the court clearly considered this an action in fraud.141 No ref-
erence was made to the opinion of the supreme court in Con-
tractor's or to the obstacle the holding in that case might present 
to the recovery of punitive damages in Sharp. 
Attempts to reconcile the results in these California cases 
generate the same confusion as did similar efforts with regard 
to the South Carolina cases. While the relevant rule of law ap-
plicable to the cases is not stated in precisely the same form in 
both states, the focus of the judicial inquiry is essentially the 
same. The South Carolina decisions do not explicitly consider 
whether the defendant's wrongful conduct partakes more of the 
character of tort or contract; the principal task is the identifica-
tion of a specific fraudulent act. In California, perhaps because 
of a statute which ostensibly precludes the recovery of punitive 
damages in contract,142 there is less empha3is upon specific fraud-
140. 48 Cal. 2d 71, 77, 307 P.2d 626, 629 (1957). 
141. 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 652-54, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588-89 (1964). 
Although the Sharp court did not specifically discuss the question of 
whether it considered plaintiff's claim chiefly tortious or contractual, 
later California decisions on similar facts have held such to be actions 
in tort for which punitive damages are recoverable. Wetherbee v. United 
Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal Rptr. 764 (1968). 
142. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 3294 (West 1970). 
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ulent acts and more reliance on a generalized inquiry into 
whether the plaintiff's claim is principally contractual or 
whether it is a tort claim which only incidentally involves con-
tract breach. In both California and South Carolina, however, 
the success of the plaintiff in recovering punitive damages de-
pends upon whether he can convince the court that enough facts 
have been proven to push his action over the line between con-
tract and tort into a clear delictual category. 
The four cases treated above seem hopelessly contradictory; 
a wider reading of additional relevant cases in both jurisdictions 
does not diminish the confusion.143 While many of the cases in 
this area make little sense because the rule which courts purport 
to apply is partly an illusion, this is not to say that every 
case in which punitive damages are allowed because the de-
fendant committed a fraudulent act concurrent with contract 
breach is mystifying.144 Courts understandably may deny a 
non-compensatory award when the defendant is guilty of noth-
ing more than a bare failure to perform the contract.145 Many 
cases, however, such as the four we have discussed, fall into an 
uncertain twilight zone between "mere" breach and obvious tort. 
It is the decisions in this zone that mock pretentions to logical 
precision. Confusion in this area of the law is perhaps inevitable, 
for it is surely difficult to apply consistently a rule whose cardi-
nal concept (fraud) many courts have persistently defined in the 
most sweeping and general terms.146 In California, the difficulty 
is aggravated because in that state the outcome depends not only 
on the meaning of fraud, but also on whether the defendant's tort 
is incidental to the breach of contract or whether the contract 
breach is incidental to the tort.147 A rule composed of concepts 
143. In South Carolina, for example, consider why the court in 
Hutcherson v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 239, 87 S.E.2d 685 
(1955), found a fraudulent failure to act and in Branham v. Wilson Motor 
Co., 188 S.C. 1, 198 S.E. 417 (1938), found that no fraudulent failure to 
act had been established. 
144. In Barber v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 189 S.C. 108, 200 
S.E. 102 (1938), defendant's agent changed the number on a payment 
receipt book from a straight life policy for $250 to a health and accident 
policy with a death benefit of only $50. The court had no difficulty in 
finding a fraudulent act sufficient to sustain the award of punitive dam-
ages. 
145. Sadler v. Pennsylvania Ref. Co., 31 F. Supp. 1 (W.D.S.C. 1940); 
Roberts v. Fore, 231 S.C. 311, 98 S.E.2d 766 (1957). 
146. See, e.g., Van Name v. F.D.LC., 130 N.J. Eq. 433, 23 A.2d 261 
(1941); Myers v. Myers, 200 Okla. 683, 199 P.2d 819 (1948); La Course 
v. Kiesel, 366 Pa. 385, 77 A.2d 877 (1951). 
147. Foster v. Keating, 120 CaL App. 2d 435, 261 P.2d 529 (1953); 
Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 674, 117 P.2d 331 (1941). 
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so obscure can be described as a governing legal doctrine only by 
a long leap of faith. 
If the rule permitting recovery of punitive damages for 
fraudulent breach of contract rests upon deceptive concepts, why 
did the courts not discard it long ago? Partly because law-
yers and judges find rules, however ghostly, comforting pres-
ences, and partly because the rule in this instance provides con-
venient camouflage for otherwise legally indefensible decisions. 
If it were confessed that the rule permitting the recovery of pu-
nitive damages for fraudulent breach is largely a iegal chimera, 
it would follow that courts that award punitive damages by in-
voking the rule are permitting non-compensatory recovery for 
breaches of contract that are merely malicious or oppressive as 
distinguished from fraudulent. Such results come perilously 
close to making the aggravated breach of contract the equivalent 
of a tort. Few courts are willing to openly acknowledge the de-
struction of established doctrines of conventional damage law, 
finding it much simpler to apply the "rule" by searching the evi-
dence for tell-tale signs of fraudulent conduct rather than to con-
fess that the rule they invoke is largely devoid of meaning.148 
D. BREACH oF CoNTRACT AccoMPANIED BY AN INDEPENDENT TORT 
Similar to the exception for fraudulent breach of contract is 
the rule that punitive damages may be recovered when the 
breach of contract is accompanied by an act that is independ-
ently and willfully tortious.149 Courts recognizing this rule ap-
parently believe that since the basis for awarding punitive dam-
ages is the defendant's independent, willful tort, there can be no 
148. The "fraud exception" to the general rule that punitive damages 
are not recoverable for breach of contract has been a useful escape hatch 
for courts in a number of jurisdictions that profess strict adherence to 
the general principle of no recovery for punitive damages in contract. 
See, e.g., Hocke Productions v. Jayark Fihns Co., 256 F. Supp. 291 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Levin v. Nielsen, 37 Ohio App. 2d 29, 306 N.E.2d 173 
(C.P."1973). 
149. "Generally, punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of 
contract; but where the acts constituting a breach of contract also amount 
to a cause of action in tort, there may be recovery of exemplary damages 
upon proper allegations and proof of intentional wrong, insult, abuse or 
gross negligence constituting an independent tort." Country Club Corp. 
v. McDaniel, 310 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also 
National Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. 
Va. 1972); Hess v. Jarboe, 201 Kan. 705, 443 P.2d 294 (1968); D.L. Fair 
Lumber Co. v. Weems, 196 Miss. 201, 16 So. 2d 770 (1944); Williams v. 
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 294 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1956); A.L. Carter 
Lumber Co. v. Saide, 140 Tex. 523, 168 S.W.2d 629 (1943). 
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conflict with the general rule merely because the parties' rela-
tionship fortuitously rests on a contract. Such an argument may 
be superficially persuasive, but it is essentially specious. It as-
sumes too casually that the line between contract and tort may 
be precisely drawn; yet marking that boundary line has been 
acknowledged by some of our ablest scholars to be among the 
most perplexing challenges in the law.150 Recourse to legal 
history only exacerbates the difficulty. At early common law, 
distinctions between tort and contract were not made because 
the forms of action, which controlled plaintiff's right to recovery, 
recognized no such categories.151 Only gradually, and with much 
uncertainty, did the law begin to separate and identify concepts 
which modern lawyers would recognize as tort and contract. 
Even today, this process of historical evolution is not fully under-
stood.1152 
Courts frequently recognize that distinctions between tort 
and contract are difficult to maintain.1153 Yet so deeply ingrained 
is the attachment to established categories that the emphasis in 
many opinions is on the development of a test which will allow 
the court to separate a mere breach of contract from a contract 
breach that also constitutes a tort. The principal test depends 
upon the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.154 
Under this test, complete non-performance of a contractual duty 
amounts to no more than a breach of contract; on the other hand, 
a defective attempted performance may rise to the level of a tort. 
While the misfeasance-nonfeasance test is not without its defend-
ers,11515 the difficulty of establishing what is misfeasance and non-
feasance in a particular case156 has limited the utility of these 
150. See generally, 5 CoRBm, supra note 3, § 1077. 
151. See Mn.soM, supra. note 7, at 316. 
152. See generally id. at 244-45. See also P. WINFIELD, THE PRov-
mcE OF THE LAW OF ToRTS 116 (1931). 
153. See, e.g., Peitzman v. City of Ilmo, 141 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1944); 
Frega v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Ass'n, 51 N.J. Super. 331, 143 A.2d 885 
(1958); International Printing Pressmen & Assistants Union v. Smith, 
145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W.2d 729 (1946). 
154. W.B. Davis & Son v. Ruple, 222 Ala. 52, 130 So. 772 (1930); 
Manley v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 47 Ga. App. 496, 170 S.E. 711 (1933); 
Chase v. Clinton County, 241 Mich. 478, 217 N.W. 565 (1928); Stone v. 
Johnson, 89 N.H. 329, 197 A. 713 (1938); Mulvey v. Staab, 4 N.M. 172, 
12 P. 699 (1887). 
155. Dean Prosser maintains that, "[m] uch scorn has been poured 
on the distinction, but it does draw a valid line between the complete 
nonperformance of a promise, which in the ordinary case is a breach of 
contract only, and a defective performance, which may also be a matter 
of tort." PRossER, supra. note 2, at 614. 
156. Southern Ry. Co. v. Grizzle, 124 Ga. 735, 53 S.E. 244 (1906); 
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concepts in drawing boundary lines between tort and contract157 
and in establishing the scope of a defendant's potential liabil-
ity.Iss 
In attempting to determine whether the plaintiff has estab-
lished an independent, willful tort in addition to a simple breach 
of contract, the limited value of the misfeasance-nonfeasance dis-
tinction or, for that matter, of any other consistently applied test, 
is reflected in the way opinions are written. Generally, appellate 
courts content themselves with statements to the effect that mere 
evil intent does not constitute an independent tort justify-
ing the recovery of punitive damages in a breach of contract 
action.159 Occasionally, a judge will write a more detailed and 
carefully reasoned opinion which attempts to explain the distinc-
tion between conduct by the contract breaker which is merely op-
pressive and actions that are independently tortious.160 The 
more typical decisions, however, consist of a summary statement 
of facts to which the court's conclusion is appended.161 
Courts frequently acknowledge that a plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion may be an inextricable mix of tort and contract elements.162 
Because the facts in such cases do not lend themselves to ready 
classification, there is a discernible tendency on the part of some 
courts to relax the requirement that a plaintiff prove the exist-
tence of an independent, willful tort as a condition to recovery 
of punitive damages. The test in this modified form commonly 
requires only that the plaintiff establish that the defendant's con-
duct was oppressive or malicious.163 If such a standard were 
Consolidated Gas Co. v. Connor, 114 Md. 140, 78 A. 725 (1910); May v. 
Tide Water Power Co., 216 N.C. 439, 5 S.E.2d 308 (1939). But see Taylor 
v. Atchison Topeka & S.F. Ry., 92 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1950). 
157. Kinnare v. Chicago, 70 Ill. App. 106 (1897), aff'd, 171 Ill. 332, 49 
N.E. 536 (1898); Obanhein v. Arbuckle, 80 App. Div. 465, 81 N.Y.S. 133 
(1903). 
158. See Buskey v. New Eng. Tel & Tel, 91 N.H. 522, 23 A.2d 367 
(1941). See also H. SHULMAN & F. JAMES, LAW OF ToRTs 1051 (2d ed. 
1956). 
159. See, e.g., Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 
1957); Mabery v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 173 Kan. 586, 250 P.2d 
824 (1952); Success Motivation Inst., Inc. v. Jamieson Film Co., 473 
S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). 
160. See the opinion by Judge Pope in McDonough v. Zamora, 338 
S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). 
161. See, e.g., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 
781 (5th Cir. 1973); Hess v. Jarboe, 201 Kan. 705, 443 P.2d 294 (1968). 
162. See generally Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 675, 117 P.2d 331 
(1941); Denn v. Denn, 222 A.2d 647 (D.C. 1966); Hankay v. Employer's 
Cas. Co., 176 S.W. 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). 
163. Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Kirk v. Safeco 
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widely applied or consistently endorsed, it would substantially in-
crease the availability of punitive damages for breach of contract. 
While terms such as "malicious or oppressive breach" are perhaps 
fully as vague as the concept of a willful, independent tort, they 
are not technical legal doctrines trailing behind them a long and 
confusing history that inhibits innovative applications. Until 
quite recently, however, few, if any, jurisdictions had explicitly 
adopted a statement of the rule permitting recovery of punitive 
damages under a liberalized standard that requires a showing 
only of malicious or oppressive breach. Opinions that seem to 
state such a definition are frequently treated in subsequent deci-
sions as aberrant examples of sloppy judicial craftsmanship 
which, with careful analysis, may be harmonized with the general 
rule that a willful, independent tort must be shown.164 
The pattern that emerges from the cases applying the will-
ful tort exception to the general rule should be familiar by now. 
Because the distinction between tort and contract is sometimes 
elusive, decisions which turn upon that distinction are difficult 
to reconcile;165 result-oriented judicial manipulation is not un-
common. A handful of recent courts have refused to continue 
writing opinions which maintain the fiction that the tort-contract 
distinction is either easy to draw or is of surpassing significance 
in determining the appropriateness of punitive damages. The de-
cision of the Supreme Court of Idaho in Boise Dodge, Inc. v. 
Clark166 is illustrative of this innovative and more candid atti-
tude. The facts in the case are simple. The plaintiff had pur-
chased a "new" automobile from the defendant. The "new" auto-
mobile was, in fact, a well-used demonstrator on which the 
odometer had been turned back. The plaintiff recovered a judg-
Ins. Co. of America, 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (C.P. 1970). See 
Delhi Pipeline Corp. v. Lewis, Inc., 408 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). 
164. The opinion of the court in McDonough v. Zamora, 338 S.W.2d 
507, 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), is typical: 
It has been said that punitive damages are permitted when a 
breach is accompanied by ''willful acts of violence, malicious or 
oppressive conduct." . . . However, it is suggested that those 
descriptive words may be symptoms of an independent tort, 
and that there must be something more than a malicious and 
oppressive breach of contract, for even an intentional breach of 
contract is not punishable by punitive damages. 
(citations omitted.) 
165. Compare Associated Heavy Equipment Schools v. Masiello, 219 
So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) with Henry Morrison Flagler 
Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434: (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Also compare 
Scheps v. Giles, 222 S.W. 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) with Orgain v. Butler, 
478 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.1972). 
166. 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969). 
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ment which included an award of punitive damages. On appeal, 
the defendant argued that since the plaintiff's action was in con-
tract, punitive damages were improperly awarded. In rejecting 
defendant's contention, the court said: 
In any event, from the legal point of view of the imposition 
of punitive damages in this case, it does not matter whether re-
spondent's counter claim technically sounded. in contract or tort. 
The rule ... is that punitive damages may be assessed in con-
tract actiolli! where there is fraud, malice, oppression or other 
sufficient reason for doing so. The rule recognizes that in cer-
tain cases elements of tort, for which punitive damages have al-. 
ways been recoverable upon a showing of malice, may be inex-
tricably mixed with elements of contract in which punitive dam-
ages generally are not recoverable.l67 
The forthright reasoning used by the court in Boise Dodge 
cuts through many of the conceptual illusions with which we 
have been struggling. It is a judicial admission-in direct terms 
-that punitive damages should be, and perhaps have been, 
more broadly available than the black letter rules suggest. 
The important question for the future of the law is whether deci-
sions like those in Boise Dodge are harbingers of fundamental le-
gal change or whether they are isolated examples of judicial can-
dor destined to be overridden by subsequent declarations of fidel-
ity to the orthodox rule. 
E. RECENT CAsES: THE BEGINNING OF CHANGE? 
A number of commentators in recent years have professed to 
discern potentially significant changes in the rules which have 
hitherto restricted the availability of punitive damages for breach 
of contract.168 It should be clear from the preceding analysis of 
the so-called orthodox cases that punitive damages have in fact 
been more readily recoverable for breach of contract than many 
have supposed. This wider availability of punitive damages over 
a long period has been largely unnoticed169 because the excep-
tions to the general rule prohibiting punitive damages are based 
on legal concepts of unusual flexibility. This conceptual flexibil-
167. Id. at 556 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted). For a differ-
ent result, on similar facts, using the conventional contract-tort test, see 
Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Leek, 272 Ala. 544, 133 So. 2d 24 (1961). 
168. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 83; Note, supra note 5; Note, Exem-
plary Damages in Contract Cases, 7 WILLAMETTE L.J. 137 (1971). 
169. Some commentators have sensed that the availability of puni-
tive damages for breach of contract has been greater than the bare repe-
tition of the black letter rules might indicate. See Simpson, supra note 
4. 
1977] PUNITIVE DAMAGES 241 
ity has allowed courts so disposed to sanction the recovery of pu-
nitive damages without seeming to impair the continued validity 
of the general rule. Certainly there have been variations among 
jurisdictions in the liberality with which exceptions to the gen-
eral rule have been allowed.170 Yet enough states have been sur-
veyed to permit the conclusion that the phenomenon just de-
scribed is broadly based. The aim here is not to detract from the 
significance of the cases discussed below, or to suggest that they 
do not-taken as a whole-represent important steps toward in-
creasing the availability of punitive damages for breach of con-
tract. Historical perspective is necessary, however, if we are to 
judge wisely whether the recent cases are the vanguard of signifi-
cant change or merely evidence a modest, incremental movement 
forward that is clearly predictable through a careful reading of 
earlier decisions. 
A line of cases, originating in California, has sustained the 
award of punitive damages in actions originating in the alleged 
breach of an insurance contract. Perhaps the most significant of 
these cases is Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,171 in which 
the plaintiff insured's claim to punitive damages for the bad 
faith failure of defendant insurer to pay fire insurance claims 
was rejected by the trial court. The California supreme court 
reversed the decision of the trial court on the ground that "there 
is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every con-
tract ... that neither party will do anything which will injure 
the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement."l72 
The court thus sanctioned the award of punitive damages in an 
action growing out of contract. The court did not, however, ac-
knowledge that it was permitting the recovery of punitive dam-
ages for breach of contract. Rather it insisted that 
liability is imposed . . . not for a bad faith breach of contract 
but for failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements. 
. . . That responsibility is not the requirement mandated by the 
terms of the policy itself-to defend, settle, or pay. It is the 
obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law ... [w]here in 
so doing, it fails to deal fairLy and in good faith with its in-
sured.173 
170. See, e.g., notes 110-17 supra and accompanying text. 
171. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032 (1973). 
172. Id. at 573, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 484, 510 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Com-
munale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 
200 (1958)). 
173. Id. at 573-74, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485, 510 P.2d at 1037 (quoting 
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17, 426 
P.2d 173,177 (1967)). 
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The holding in Gruenberg, that in every contract there is an 
implied covenant of good faith or fair dealing, is fully supported 
by an earlier line of California cases.174 Gruenberg itself has 
been cited in an unusually large number of later California deci-
sions.175 It has also been relied upon by the courts of other states 
as an aid in establishing an implied duty of good faith as a condi-
tion for awarding punitive damages in an action growing out of 
contract.176 It is especially significant that reliance upon Gruen-
berg by non-California courts has occurred in some jurisdictions 
which have traditionally been firmly against the award of 
punitive damages in actions arising in contract.177 In sum, 
although the Gruenberg rationale has not been uniformly 
adopted, 178 its reception has been predominantly favorable.179 
How significant are the cases both in and outside California 
that have adopted the Gruenberg rationale as a basis for award-
ing punitive damages in a breach of contract action? Viewed 
from one perspective, the Gruenberg decision is supported by a 
large body of existing case law; the deus ex machina employed 
by the Gruenberg court to permit recovery of punitive damages 
has made appearances before. The judicial implication of a good 
faith duty to perform contractual obligations is similar to the 
duty of good faith accompanying a fiduciary relationship. Simi-
larly, we may trace the lineage of the Gruenberg doctrine to 
those venerable cases in which punitive damages were awarded 
174. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 
3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 
425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173 (1967); Communale v. Traders & Gen. 
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). 
175. E.g., Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 
783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975); Elliano v. Assurance Co. of America, 45 
Cal. App. 3d 170, 119 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1975); Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers 
Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975). 
176. E.g., United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alaska 
1974); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care, 29 lil. App. 3d 339, 
330 N.E.2d 540 (1975); United States Fidel. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 
91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975). 
177. Illinois is a state that has consistently refused to allow punitive 
damages for breach of contract. See, e.g., Sears v. Weisman, 6 ill App. 
3d 827, 286 N.E.2d 777 (1972); Ash v. Barrett, 1 lll. App. 3d 414, 274 
N.E.2d 149 (1971). With these earlier cases, compare the post-Gruenberg 
opinion of the Illinois court of appeals in Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan 
for Hosp. Care, 29 lil. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975). 
178. See MacDonald v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 232 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The Florida court read the California cases as 
mere restatements of the traditional exception that punitive damages for 
breach of contract are available if breach is accompanied by an inde-
pendent, willful tort. 
179. See cases cited at notes 175-76 supra. 
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against public service companies.180 In those cases, the award 
of punitive damages was justified despite the existence of a con-
tractual relationship between the parties because of the inci-
dental, non-contractual relationship between a public service 
company and its customer. It was the breach of that non-con-
tractual duty, so the reasoning went, that allowed the recovery 
of punitive damages. 
Depending upon the extent to which courts are willing to im-
pose a duty to perform in good faith on the parties to every con-
tract, the Gruenberg decision may have a substantially broader 
precedential significance than either the fiduciary duty or public 
service company cases. Thus far, the Gruenberg rationale has 
been applied only to actions involving the breach of contracts 
of insurance, which traditionally have received special treatment 
in the law.181 If, however, as recent scholarship maintains, there 
is a duty of good faith "at every stage of the contractual process, 
from preliminary negotiation through performance to discharge, 
and in nearly all kinds of contracts,"182 the Gruenberg rationale 
may reach very far indeed. 
Because Gruenberg itself is hardly four years old, however, 
it is difficult to judge the significance of its reasoning as a device 
for allowing recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract. 
The greatest source of uncertainty is the peculiar character of im-
plied duties of good faith. The greatest legal scholars, Holmes 
among them,l 811 have recognized the difficulty of understanding 
why the law recognizes implied duties in certain kinds of cases. 
Attempting to explicate the forces which move judges to find im-
plied duties or obligations is a most frustrating exercise. Law-
yers are trained to believe that the use of legal logic and the 
application of established dogma to particular facts will yield pre-
dictable results. The wisest scholars and judges, however, have 
understood that the formulation of legal policy is not inevitably 
an exercise in logic as lawyers understand that term, but the 
product of many forces, some grasped quite clearly and others 
only dimly understood, which intermingle to produce a decision in 
18(}. See notes 98-107 supra and accompanying text. 
181. W. VANCE, l!ANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 114-15 (3d ed. 
B. Anderson 1951). 
182. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales 
Provisions of the Uniform Cammercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 216 
(1968). 
183. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 liARv. L. REV. 457, 465-66 
(1897). 
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a particular case.184 Good faith has no definite meaning;185 the 
reasons for its invocation in a particular case are not always clear. 
We cannot really know why the Gruenberg court and others that 
have adopted that decision have chosen to find a duty. Because 
this is so, we cannot honestly predict whether Gruenberg repre-
sents the beginning of a new treatment of punitive damages in 
the law of contracts. As Professor Leon Green wrote so percep-
tively many years ago: 
How does the stating of the problem in terms of duties en-
able a judge to pass judgment? Where shall he find the source 
of duties? Do judges find them ready made? . . . Do they cre-
ate them? . . . We are clearly dealing with the very processes 
by which law is generated. And doubtless the questions as to 
the paternity of these duties brought forth in case after case is 
embarrasing enough at best.l86 , 
Even if the Gruenberg decision should become a powerful 
progenitor of legal change, it will only serve to mark a transi-
tional point in the law. The decision, depending heavily on the 
distinction between a breach of t~e contract itself, for which pu-
nitive damages are not recoverable, and the tortious breach of an 
implied duty of good faith, which subjects the contract breaker 
to liability for punitive damages, is susceptible to the same criti-
cisms as the more general exception for independent torts.187 As 
an attempt to maintain, in theory at least, the traditionally sharp 
distinction between damages recoverable in contract and in tort, 
the line drawn in Gruenberg and later decisions is of dubious 
validity. So long as courts continue to act on the apparent be-
lief that it is important to distinguish between remedies available 
for breach of contract and for tort, however, and are content 
to write opinions indicating that there is a meaningful distinction 
between a mere breach of contract and tortious violation of a 
duty of good faith performance, the law of punitive damages in 
contract will continue to be shifting and ill-defined.18 8 
184. See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1014 (1928). 
185. Summers, supra note 182, at 201. 
186. See Green, supra note 184, at 1024. 
187. See notes 148-67 supra and accompanying text. 
188. It is surprising how frequently attempts to break down the bar-
riers between tort and contract are resisted. Even Dean Prosser, who 
clearly recognized the difficulty in distinguishing between tort and con-
tract, wrote: 
The first question which arises in this curious dichotomy 
is when a breach of contract is also a tort. It is obvious that this 
cannot be true in every case, or there would be no distinction 
left at all; and that the more or less inevitable efforts of lawyers 
to turn the one into the other must somewhere be brought to a 
halt. 
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Recent decisions, however, have sustained the award of puni· 
tive damages in a contract action on grounds which go beyond the 
Gruenberg rationale. The holdings in these cases are not based 
on the alleged breach of an implied duty of good faith; rather it 
is the breach of the contract itself which is said to constitute the 
tortious act for which punitive damages are recoverable. The de· 
cision of the Indiana court of appeals in Vernon Fire and Cas-
ualty Insurance Co. v. Sharp189 is an important example. In Ver· 
non, the defendant insurer refused to pay the plaintiff's legit-
imate claim for property and equipment fire losses incurred at 
plaintiff's factory. The defendant could offer no reasonable ex-
planation for its refusal. The trial court's award of punitive 
damages was sustained on appeal. The appellate court held that 
"the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the 
insurer's conduct amounted to heedless disregard of the conse-
quences, malice, gross fraud or oppressive conduct."190 It is par-
ticularly significant that, as authority for its holding, the court 
cited, without comment, cases in which punitive damages were 
awarded but in which no contract was at issue.191 In short, 
the Vernon opinion can be read as eliminating any basis for treat-
ing the award of punitive damages in a contract action as subject 
to a materially different standard than that used in the ordi-
nary tort case.192 The Vernon opinion is not an isolated ex-
ample of advanced judicial thinking. A number of other recent 
cases, not limited to suits in which an insurance company is a de-
fendant, have been reported in which punitive damages have 
been awarded in contract actions on similar grounds.193 
Prosser, supra note 105, at 387. More recently, some scholars have 
expressed the view that perhaps there is no reason why breach of con-
tract should not simply be a species of tort. See Poulton, Tort or Con-
tract, 82 LAW Q. REV. 346, 350-51 (1966). 
189. 316 N.E.2d 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), modified on other grounds, 
349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1976). 
190. Id. at 384. 
191. Id. Among other cases, the court cites True Temper Corp. v. 
Moore, 299 N.E.2d 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973). 
192. See note 194 infra. 
193. See, e.g., Whitfield Constr. Co. v. Commercial Dev. Corp., 392 
F. Supp. 982 (D.V.I. 1975); Rex Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 323 N.E.2d 270 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1975); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975). Other 
courts, while rejecting the award of punitive damages in the case before 
them, have clearly intimated that punitive damages for breach of con-
tract may be recovered under a liberal standard similar to the rule an-
nounced in Vernon. See, e.g., Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Hawaii 18, 501 
P.2d 368 (1972); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 
(1975). 
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The significance of the development represented by decisions 
like Vernon is difficult to judge. Viewed independently of the 
judicial environment from which they evolved, these cases seem 
to be of undeniably great significance as straightforward state-
ments by various courts that the breach of a contract itself can 
justify the award of punitive damages without need to resort to 
any of the established exceptions to the general rule. Such judi-
cial declarations come quite close to making every breach of con-
tract a species of tort.194 Yet in assessing the impact of cases like 
Vernon, it is especially important that they not be viewed in iso-
lation either from the accumulated body of past decisions or from 
the ongoing process of contemporary decision making. The ma-
jority of contemporary courts continue to render decisions con-
sistent with the traditional rule that punitive damages may not 
be recovered for breach of contract.195 Indeed, in a few jurisdic-
tions which have traditionally adhered to a somewhat more lib-
eral standard in the award of punitive damages, there is evidence 
of a retreat to more orthodox territory.196 In sum, it seems fair 
to say that the law is in the midst of a potentially significant 
change, but that the reach and durability of that change are un-
certain. 
Moreover, the conclusion that Vernon and its companion 
cases represent a change of immense significance is undermined 
by examination of earlier cases which suggest that the general 
rule denying punitive damages in contract cases has never really 
been the impenetrable barrier it has appeared to be. Many of the 
194. To observe that every breach of contract may be considered a 
tort is not to say that punitive damages are recoverable for every breach 
of contract. The implication of the Vernon decision and others like it 
is that punitive damages will be available for breach of contract on es-
sentially the same grounds that they are now recoverable in tort. Puni-
tive damages in tort are generally recoverable only upon a showing of 
aggravated or reckless conduct. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 9-10. That 
same limitation will doubtless apply to all attempted recoveries of puni-
tive damages for breach of contract. 
195. See, e.g., Davis Cattle Co., Inc. v. Great Western Sugar Co., 393 
F. Supp. 1165 (D. Col. 1975); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Coburn, 209 
S.E.2d 655, 132 Ga. App. 859 (1975); Tax v. Overton, 534 P.2d 679 (Okla. 
1974); White v. Rob Roy Dairy, Inc., 524 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. 1974). 
196. In Texas, a state that has been considered more liberal than 
some others in the award of punitive damages for breach of contract, 
recent cases manifest an intention to apply a more strict standard to 
plaintiffs seeking punitive damages. See Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. 
v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); White v. Rob Roy DairY, 
Inc., 524 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); Boswell v. Hughes, 491 S.W.2d 
762 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). Chief Justice Ramsey's dissenting opinion in 
BoswelL is of special note. Id. at 764. 
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so-called established exceptions to the general rule simply have 
afforded traditional courts more latitude in escaping the stric-
tures of the rule without seeming to violate it. In some 
jurisdictions, the so-called exceptions have been construed 
broadly enough to raise doubts as to the continuing viability of 
the rule. Then, too, there has long existed a small body 
of cases which reflect a sporadic and largely unremarked judi-
cial inclination to award punitive damages on quite liberal 
grounds.197 These earlier cases suggest that decisions like V er-
non really represent an outgrowth of a heretofore camouflaged 
doctrine rather than the announcement of any startlingly new le-
gal principles. Against this background, the much heralded re-
cent cases seem less significant as exemplars of legal change. 
Thus, the most that unequivocally may be said about deci-
sions like Vernon is that they evidence a tendency to decide di-
rectly what many earlier courts had been at pains to conceal: 
there really are no insurmountable theoretical objections to the 
award of punitive damages for breach of contract on a basis simi-
lar to that which governs in the typical tort case, that is, where 
defendant's conduct is oppressive or malicious. Doubtless there 
is much to be said for this increase in judicial candor. 
Wide adherence to the rationale of the Vernon decision would 
greatly enhance the clarity of existing doctrine in this area of 
damage law. More than this, the Vernon court's approach would 
make the results in many decided cases conform more closely 
with the courts' explanations for their decisions. The legal prin-
ciples which constitute the law of punitive damages in contract 
would thus be more rational and the results produced by the 
application of those principles more predictable-not insignifi-
cant objects of reform. 
However significant the nascent changes in this area of the 
law ultimately may prove to be/98 we should do more than 
merely describe the results of cases which trace out the develop-
ing pattern of change. It is important that we explore and seek 
to understand the reasons why, at this time in the development 
197. See, e.g., Jones v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251, 280 P. 942 (1929); Anchor 
Co. v. Adams, 139 Va. 388, 124 S.E. 438 (1924); Gatzow v. Buening, 106 
Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900). 
198. It is too early to speculate-as some commentators have-that 
decisions like Vernon, which appear to liberalize the availability of puni-
tive damages for breach of contract, constitute the irresistible wave of 
the future. See Note, supra note 5, which assumes, without ex-
planation, that the progress of cases which broaden the availability 
of punitive damages is inevitable. Id. at 689. 
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of law, courts have begun to award punitive damages for breach 
of contract without resort to the doctrinal smoke screen of such 
traditional exceptions as the separate fraudulent act or an inde-
pendent, willful tort rule. 
The recent cases extending the availability of punitive dam-
ages in contract have, of course, increased the scope of a defend-
ant's potential liability, a result consistent with the broader tend-
encies of modern damage law. Professor Gilmore has charac-
terized this development as "an explosion of liability."199 A per-
suasive, but partial, explanation for the expansion of punitive 
damages in contract cases may be found in changing perceptions 
of the proper social roles of great economic power and of those 
who wield it. The corporation is the most typical form through 
which economic power is exercised, and it is the large and power-
ful corporation which frequently possesses sufficient economic 
leverage to exploit the relative weakness of the other party to 
a contract. In view of this economic reality, it should not be 
surprising that many of the most important recent cases award-
ing punitive damages in contract involve an ordinary consu~n:er 
as plaintiff and a large insurance company as defendant.200 
It cannot be doubted that contract damage has been shaped 
historically by prevailing attitudes toward the economic sys-
tem. Professor Richard Danzig has persuasively argued that 
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale201 was at least partly the 
result of the perceived need to shelter the corporate entre-
preneur from excessive liability in order to promote desired in-
dustrial development.202 The character and the function of the 
corporation have changed greatly since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. It is axiomatic that the large, modern corporation no 
longer unites ownership and management in the same hands, and 
that shareholders of the typical public corporation have little 
voice in the conduct of corporate affairs. 203 Indeed, some econo-
mists argue that the large corporation has grown so powerful 
that the corporation itself rather than market forees controls 
what goods will be produced and distributed.204 
199. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 65. 
200. See cases cited at notes 175-76 supra. 
201. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). 
202. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization 
of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUDIES 249 (1975). Professor Danzig does not 
contend that the rule in Hadley was wholly the product of the economic 
climate then prevailing. He does suggest that the dominant economic 
values of the day played some part in the court's decision. 
203. See A BEHLE & G. MEANs, THE MoDERN CoRPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 112-16 (rev. ed. 1968). 
204. Perhaps the dominant recent spokesman for the view that the 
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The conviction that the modern large corporation controls 
the market is by no means universally shared.205 Yet recent de-
velopments in damage law sometimes reflect a preoccupation 
with the conviction that corporate power is often abused and that 
the corporation's freedom to act is not such an unalloyed good 
that it should be encouraged at the expense of competing values. 
Contemporary contract law emphasizes concepts such as uncon-
scionability and the relative bargaining power of parties to agree-
ments.206 Such doctrines are open-ended and unformed,207 but 
they have been used to restrict the power of strong parties to un-
fairly shape contractual terms to their advantage.208 The grow-
ing availability of punitive damages for breach of contract is con-
sistent with the recent emphasis in substantive contract law on 
doctrines designed to protect against the abuse of bargaining 
power,209 because the award of punitive damages increases the 
severity of sanctions which may be imposed on a contract breaker 
who has engaged in sufficiently egregious conduct.210 
There have been surprisingly few attempts to explain the 
causes of this growing judicial willingness to award punitive 
damages for breach of contract. The occasional efforts that have 
been made emphasize the disparity of economic power that may 
exist between the aggrieved party and the breaching party, argu-
ing that the inquiry must focus on the question of whether the 
plaintiff is a "big guy" or a "little guy."211 Presumably, the 
plaintiff who has been victimized by the defendant's abuse of 
concentration of corporate power has destroyed the central role of the 
free market is Professor J.K. Galbraith. His views are set forth at length 
in J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDusTRIAL STATE (2d ed. rev. 1971). 
205. See, e.g., Solow, The New Industrial State or Son of Affluence, 
9 PUB. INTEREST 100 (Fall 1967) ; Gordon, 'l;'he Close of the Galbraith-
ian System, 76 J. PoL. ECON. 635 (1968). 
206. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302; Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1963); American Home Improvement Co. v. 
Maciver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964). 
207. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1041, 1042-44 {1976). 
208. See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971); 
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969). 
209. For a somewhat critical view of the principal doctrines of the 
new contract learning, see Sullivan, Book Review, 17 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 403, 412-16 (1976). 
210. Judicial concern about the abuse of corporate power in the bar-
gaining process has not been confined to the modem era. See note 102 
supra and accompanying text. 
211. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 206-07 
(1973). See Note, supra note 5. 
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superior bargaining power will recover punitive damages, under 
the rationale of the newer cases. There is evidence to support 
this thesis. If we consider cases decided even under the tradi-
tional exceptions to the general rule, judgments were frequently 
rendered which may be viewed as attempts to punish the abuse 
of superior bargaining power.212 An examination of the newer 
cases likewise confirms the importance of the parties' bargaining 
power as a central factor in the decision. Specifically, cases 
which have adopted the Gruenberg rationale have usually in-
volved corporate defendants who wield much greater market 
power than the typical consumer-plaintiff.213 Even in a number 
of newer cases in which the award of punitive damages was con-
sidered but disapproved, the courts' opinions suggest that the rel-
ative bargaining power of the parties, as an aspect of the eco-
nomic context within which the transaction occurred, made some 
difference in the court's analysis.214 Finally, in the broader field 
of modern contract law, recent scholarship indicates that the rel-
ative bargaining status of the parties is a useful predictive tool 
in rationalizing seemingly conflicting results in cases which pre-
sent similar issues. 215 
Thus, the thesis that disparity in bargaining power explains 
212. The public services exception, see text accompanying notes 97-
106 supra, is readily explainable as a means of preventing abuse of the 
monopQly power held by such defendants as railroads or public utilities. 
Inequality in bargaining power may also be a helpful touchstone in rec-
onciling seeming conflicts among fraudulent breach of contract cases. 
See text accompanying notes 121-43 supra. Thus in Sullivan v. Cal-
houn, 117 S.C. 137, 108 S.E. 189 (1921), for example, the successful plain-
tiff was a sharecropper; the defendant was his landlord. In Sharp v. 
Automobile Club of Calif., 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585 
(1964), the winning plaintiff was an ordinary consumer. The unsuccess-
ful plaintiffs in Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., 166 S.C. 454, 
165 S.E. 203 (1932), and Contractors Safety Ass'n v. California Comp. 
Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 71, 307 P.2d 626 (1957), were both experienced in 
business and both arguably possessed economic leverage that share-
croppers or ordinary consumers would not have. Certainly decisions 
like those in Gruenberg, Vernon, and their progeny may be seen as 
aiming at the chastisement of those who have abused great bargaining 
power. 
213. See, e.g., Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 
3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975); Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 
44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975). 
214. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 
43 (1975); Isagholian v. Carnegie Inst., 51 Mich. App. 220, 214 N.W.2d 
864 (1973). 
215. See Childres & Spitz, Status of the Law in Contract, 47 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 1 (1972). Professors Childres and Spitz convincingly demonstrate 
that in cases applying the parol evidence rule, results are dependent 
upon the status of the contracting parties. 
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the increase of punitive damage awards in contract cases is per-
suasive. But it must be kept in reasonable perspective: the re-
cent cases are too few in number to support any sweeping conclu-
sions as to the cause of the developing trend toward more liberal 
punitive damage awards. Firm conclusions must await the slow 
unfolding of the judicial process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The title of this Article refers to the reality and the illusion 
of legal change. A careful analysis of the role of punitive dam-
ages in the law of contract suggests the difficulties inherent in 
determining what meaningful legal change is. It is a rela-
tively simple matter to examine a handful of recent cases and 
to proclaim that a major doctrinal upheaval is at hand. In assess-
ing the significance of any asserted legal change, it is more useful 
but more difficult to examine the recent cases within the histori-
cal context of which they are an inseparable part. 
Recent decisions rendered in a number of jurisdictions justify 
the conclusion that legal barriers to the award of punitive dam-
ages in contract are being lowered. Do these recent decisions 
represent a significant legal change which lends support to Pro-
fessor Gilmore's conviction that tort and contract principles are 
beginning to converge? A fair answer would be a qualified yes. 
The answer must be qualified because, as we have seen, the tradi-
tional rules rigidly proscribing the award of punitive damages 
in contract have frequently yielded quite surprising results. We 
have noted, for example, older cases sanctioning the award of 
punitive damages by the creation of "independent duties" or 
"fiduciary obligations," the breach of which-in the court's anal-
ysis-offered a way out of the dilemma posed by the traditional 
rule. These older decisions dearly suggest that judicial sym-
pathy for the award of punitive damages in selected contract 
actions is not altogether newly-minted. While it is true that 
many of the post-Gruenberg cases may be viewed as a pre-
dictable stage in a process of orderly judicial evolution, they are 
less circumspect and more explicitly innovative in their approach 
to the award of punitive damages in contract than the older deci-
sions. In sum, Gruenberg and its progeny represent genuine le-
gal change, but a change quite firmly connected to an earlier 
line of cases that produced similar results by more oblique means. 
In assessing the value of the evolving new standard, it should 
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be clearly understood that punitive damages in contract cannot 
be considered consistent with the traditional descriptions of the 
objects of contract damage law.216 Damages for breach of con-
tract theoretically are aimed at compensating for pecuniary loss, 
while punitive damages-originating in tort cases-are given 
to compensate for specifically non-pecuniary injuries. Yet too 
much can be made of the inconsistency between the theory 
of punitive damages and the traditional aims of contract dam-
age law. The boundary line between tort and contract is not al-
ways clear. It was in cases that resisted easy categorization as 
either tort or contract that courts began to expand the availabil-
ity of punitive damages. Some recent decisions sanctioning 
the award of punitive damages in contract do not manifest much 
concern as to whether the plaintiff's claim falls on the tort or 
contract side of the borderline. This judicial attitude may be 
more casual than calculated, but it suggests that the most impor-
tant question for future legal scholars may be not whether puni-
tive damage awards are consistent with contract damage princi-
ples, but rather, what is the likely effect of the recent cases on 
the continued integrity of distinctions between contract and tort, 
and what are the implications of undermining those distinctions. 
Legal change is rarely revolutionary. The collapse of the 
tort-contract distinction is not imminent, but recent decisions lib-
eralizing the availability of punitive damages in contract have 
contributed to a process of change which has greatly increased 
the territory occupied by Dean Prosser's shadowy 'borderland be-
tween tort and contract. How rapidly it may proceed and where 
it will ultimately lead, no careful scholar can confidently predict. 
216. In practice, of course, contract damages are both more specula-
tive and thus more "punitive" than the statements of this traditional rule 
intimate. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. 
